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GO WORLD

SUMMER 1987 NO.48



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The cover: Detail from a folding screen painting by Hokkai Yusho showing the Four Accomplishments of the ancient Chinese: the lute, go, calligraphy, and painting. This painting, which is in the collection of the Myoshinji temple in Kyoto, is designated an Important Cultural Treasure.

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Go World News

Kobayashi Defends Kisei, Loses Judan

The top three players in the go world remain Kobayashi, Kato and Takemiya, but the balance of power between them is shifting. By rebuffing the challenge of Takemiya for the 11th Kisei title, Kobayashi has maintained his place at the top of the heap, but immediately after his success he met with disaster in the 25th Judan title match. Just as Takemiya seems unable to beat Kobayashi, so Kobayashi seems helpless against Kato. He was only able to win one game in the Judan title match against him and has now been bested by him in three title matches in a row (he lost the 1985 Oza title match 0-3 and the 1986 Meijin title match 0-4 to Kato).

The springboard for Kobayashi's rise to the top was his 3-2 come-from-behind victory over Kato in the 1984 Judan title match, in which he scored three half-point wins. This time Kato took revenge by taking back the title with a half-point win in the fourth game.

The games themselves were not one-sided, but Kato always seems to outplay Kobayashi in the endgame. The latter can only pray that Kato does not become the Kisei challenger.

The results:

Game 1 (5 March). Kato (B) won by resignation.

Game 2 (27 March). Kato (W) won by 4½ points.

Game 3 (2 April). Kobayashi (W) won by resig.

Game 5 (16 April). Kato (W) won by ½ point.

Yamashiro's Second Challenge for Honinbo Title

Yamashiro Hiroshi played brilliantly in an extremely strong Honinbo league to become the challenger for the second year in a row, but once again he has found that he cannot make any impact on the title-holder Takemiya. The latter went into a slump after his bad setback in the Kisei title match, but he recovered just in time. The title match has started in the same fashion as last year, with Takemiya winning the first two games. Fans expected Yamashiro to do better with the experience of one big title match under his belt, but he still seems to be no match for Takemiya, who has reverted to the large-scale game that he plays best.

The crucial game for Yamashiro in the league came in the fifth round, played on 12 February, when he beat Cho Chikun by half a point. He finished two points ahead of the field, which,



Kato recaptures the Judan title from Kobayashi with a half-point victory in the fourth game. His new-found mastery of the endgame was what made the vital difference.

42nd Honinbo League

Rank	Player	Y	C	R	K.K.	K	S	O	O.R.	Score	Place
1	Yamashiro	—	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	6—1	1
2	Cho Chikun	0	—	1	0	1	1	1	0	4—3	2
3	Rin Kaiho	1	0	—	0	1	1	1	0	4—3	3
4	Kobayashi	0	1	1	—	1	0	1	0	4—3	4
5	Kato	0	0	0	0	—	1	0	1	2—5	—
5	Sakata	0	0	0	1	0	—	0	1	2—5	—
5	Otake	0	0	0	0	1	1	—	0	2—5	—
5	O Rissei	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	—	4—3	—

Note: Players are ranked according to their results in the previous league.

when you look at the calibre of the opposition in the 42nd league, is an outstanding performance. Yamashiro has established himself as the top player of the post-Cho group, but after two decades in which it became routine for players to reach the top in their mid-twenties, we now have a situation in which no player in his twenties has won one of the three big titles.

The unluckiest player in this year's league was O Rissei (at 28 the same age as Yamashiro, Kataoka, and Kobayashi Satoru, who are considered the top players of their age group). For some time now O has seemed to be on the verge of breaking into the big time and with wins against Cho, Kobayashi Koichi, Rin and Otake he at least deserved to keep his place in the league. The most surprising performance was that of Kato, who must have had his mind on other things. Otake's result was just as bad, but then he has never done well in the Honinbo tournament.

Leading Title Winners

Kato's win in the Judan title lifts him to sole third place in the list of top title winners. The placings as of May 1987 are:

1. Sakata Eio: 64 titles
2. Otake Hideo: 36
3. Kato Masao: 25
4. Rin Kaiho, Cho Chikun: 24
6. Fujisawa Shuko: 21
7. Ishida Yoshio, Kobayashi Koichi: 20
9. Takagawa Shukaku: 18
10. Shimamura Toshihiro: 15
11. Hashimoto Utaro: 12
12. Kobayashi Reiko: 10

13. Iwata Tatsuaki, Takemiya Masaki: 9

15. Ito Tomoe: 8

16. Fujisawa Hosai, Ohira Shuzo, Hashimoto Shoji, Honda Sachiko: 7

20. Yamashiro Hiroshi, Sugiuchi Kazuko: 6.

Nie Wins 2nd Super Go Series for China

Like the 1st series, the 2nd Japan-China Super Go Series has ended in a personal triumph for Nie — and one even more spectacular. The first time around, Nie rescued a team on the brink of defeat with wins against Kobayashi Koichi, Kato, and Fujisawa Shuko. This time the Chinese team was in even worse trouble, being behind 4—8, but Nie singlehandedly engineered a remarkable fightback, defeating Kataoka, Yamashiro, Sakai, Takemiya, and finally the Japanese captain Otake.

Nie has now won eight games in a row in the Super Go series against some of the top players in Japanese go, and the Japanese go press has dubbed him 'the iron goalkeeper'. This performance has, of course, confirmed his status as a national hero in China and is said to have sparked a go boom among young people there. In a country which worships its table tennis and volleyball players, Nie has become one of the three most famous sports stars. One surprising thing about his success is that in recent years he has been overtaken by Ma in internal tournaments, yet in international matches there is no comparison between the two. Ma has only won one of his three games in the two Super Go series. Nie seems to have the knack of winning the games that really count — the greater the pressure

the better he plays.

We plan to present the final game with Otake in GW50. In the meantime, the 3rd series has already started. In the first game, Yang Hui 7-dan, one of the top three women players in China, defeated Ogawa Tomoko 4-dan, the Women's Honinbo. Yang then lost to Miyazawa 7-dan, who in turn lost to Liu Xiaoguang 8-dan, so the Chinese team is leading 2-1. The other team members are — Japan: Ishii Kunio 9-dan, Kobayashi Satoru 8-dan, Kudo Norio 9-dan, Ohira Shuzo 9-dan, Yamashiro, Takemiya, and Kato; China: Wang Qun 8-dan (1984 WAGC winner), Qian Yuping 8-dan, Rui Naiwei 8-dan, Jiang Zhujie 8-dan, Tsao Dayuan 9-dan, Ma, and Nie. It's interesting to see that the Japanese are giving Yamashiro, Takemiya, and Kato a chance to redeem themselves. Will they be able to stop Nie this time?

Japanese Team's Successful Tour of China

In late May and early June this year an eight-man Japanese team headed by Kato Masao toured China as the 15th in the series of annual goodwill tours. The Japanese team won 32 of the 56 games they played, making this the most successful visit to China since the first tour in 1973 (when they won 40 games). Once again the highlight of the tour was the best-of-three individual matches held as part of the team matches and here too the Japanese triumphed, winning ten of the 16 matches. This success must have been some consolation for the Japanese setback in the Super Go series, but the fly in the ointment was the dismal performance of the team captain Kato. He only won two games out of seven and he lost his best-of-three matches 0-2 to Nie and 1-2 to Ma. He also lost a game to Jiang 8-dan — all in all, hardly the performance you expect from the Meijin.

We hope to present a full report in a later issue of *Go World*.

Establishment of the Iwamoto Foundation

In April this year Iwamoto Kaoru 9-dan donated the property in Ebisu that housed his go club, the Kunwa Salon, to the Nihon Ki-in to be used for the promotion of go around the world. The sale of the property realized 530 million yen (about \$3.7 million) and this sum was used to create the Iwamoto Foundation for the Pro-

motion of Go. The aim of the foundation will be to promote go both internationally and within Japan. Iwamoto sees his donation as a way of repaying his lifelong debt to the go world.

One of the main tasks of the foundation will be to establish go centres throughout the world, an objective Iwamoto has been working constantly to realize in recent years. The first site will be San Francisco, where plans are already well advanced for creating a permanent home for go. It is hoped that other sites will soon follow.



Imamura Fumiaki

Imamura Wins 9th WAGC

For only the second time a non-Chinese player has won the World Amateur Go Championship and the player who did it was the one who first broke the Chinese monopoly. Imamura Fumiaki of Japan repeated his success in the 2nd WAGC in 1980, but this time he won by the narrowest possible margin. Three players — Imamura, Yu Bin of China and Lee Kwan Chol of Korea ended in a tie, all on 7-1; Imamura and Yu were tied on SOS (sum of opponents' scores), the first method for breaking a tie; they were also tied on SODOS (sum of defeated opponents' scores), so Imamura took first place by virtue of the fact that he had defeated Yu in their encounter in the second round. Poor Lee, who bested Imamura but lost to Yu, had to be content with third place.

This tournament was held in Beijing, making it the first to leave Japan. The hard work and generous hospitality of the Chinese Weiqi Association ensured that it was a great success.

The top places:

1. Imamura Fumiaki (Japan): 7-1
2. Yu Bin (China): 7-1
3. Lee Kwan Chol (Korea): 7-1

12th Meijin League (as of 20 June 1987)

Rank	Player	K	C	I	T	R	Y	F	O	S	Score
1	Kobayashi K.	—		1	0	0	1	0		1	3 — 3
2	Cho Chikun		—	1	1	0	1		0	1	4 — 2
3	Ishida A.	0	0	—	1		1	0	1	0	3 — 4
4	Takemiya	1	0	0	—	1				0	2 — 3
5	Rin Kaiho	1	1		0	—		1	1		4 — 1
6	Yamashiro	0	0	0			—	1		1	2 — 3
7	Fujisawa S.	1		1		0	0	—	1	0	3 — 3
7	Otake		1	0		0		0	—	0	1 — 4
7	Shiraishi	0	0	1	1		0	1	1	—	4 — 3

Note: Players are ranked according to their results in the previous league.

4. Tsang Pingfai (Hong Kong): 6—2
5. Jong Choi (Canada): 5—3
6. Matthew Macfadyen (U.K.): 5—3
7. Janusz Kraszek (Poland): 5—3
8. Song Moo Yong (Brazil): 5—3
9. Tibor Pocsai (Hungary): 5—3
10. Jean Michel (France): 5—3
11. Laurent Heiser (Luxembourg): 5—3
12. Victor Bogdanov (U.S.S.R.): 5—3
13. Egbert Rittner (West Germany): 5—3

Rin Leads 12th Meijin League

After six rounds Rin Kaiho is in the sole lead in this year's Meijin league with 5—1, thus making our comments in the introduction to the Gosei game on page 7 (written earlier this year) out of date. Such formidable players as Kobayashi Koichi (3—3) and Takemiya Masaki (2—3) have dropped behind, so Rin's main rival at this stage is Cho Chikun, who is following closely on 4—2. Cho lost on time in his 5th-round game against Rin.

The Meijin league is notoriously hard to predict, as we know from bitter experience, so we should note that if Rin loses his final two games, then besides Cho, Kobayashi, Takemiya, and Fujisawa Shuko still have a theoretical chance of becoming the challenger.

Kato to Challenge Cho Gosei

In the final to decide the challenger for the 12th Gosei title, played on 11 June, Kato defeated Kobayashi Koichi by 4½ points. Kato thus maintained the ascendancy that he has established over Kobayashi recently. However, he does almost as badly against Cho in title matches as Kobayashi

does against him, so he won't be approaching the title match with too much confidence. The first game will be played on 3 July.



Kong 8-dan

Kong Shangming Studying in Japan

Kong Shangming, wife of Nie Weiping and one of the world's three women 8-dans, has taken a year's leave of absence from family and work to study in Japan. The subject is not go but the Japanese language. She is attending a language school and after about half a year here has made good progress towards her goal of mastering Japanese. Her go seems to be suffering a little from neglect, for she is doing badly in a special five-game series sponsored by *Igo Club* and pitting her against five young Japanese professionals. In the four games played to date, she lost to Ogata Masaki 6-dan and Oya Koichi 6-dan, picked up a win against Ogawa Tomoko 4-dan, then lost against Goto Shungo 6-dan.

Few Surprises in 1987 Dutch Championship

Players in the 1987 Dutch Championship finished in the same order that they ranked in the 1986 European Championship.

1. Ronald Schlemper 7-dan defended his Dutch title in the same manner as he defended his European title, by winning all of his games.

2. Frank Janssen 5-dan came second, as in the EC, losing only to Schlemper.

3. Robert Rehm 5-dan, who at 18th was the 3rd-highest Dutchman in the EC, lost two games and came third, just as he did last year.

4. Rene Aaij 4-dan, who was unable to compete in the 1986 EC because he played in the European Shogi Championship, held about the same time (he came second), took fourth place with three wins out of six games.

5. Jan van der Steen was the only surprise, finishing 6th and becoming the only 3-dan to gain a direct qualification for next year's championship.

6. Mark Boon 4-dan, the 4th-top Dutch player in the EC in 28th place, also won three games.

Complete places are given below:

1. Schlemper 6-0
2. Janssen 5-1
3. Rehm 4-2
4. Aaij 3-3
5. van der Steen 3-3
6. Boon 3-3
7. Michiel Eijkhout 4-dan 3-3
8. Arend-Jan Westhoff 4-dan 3-3
9. Erik Puyt 4-dan 2-4
10. Walther Warnaar 3-dan 2-4
11. Joost Cremers 4-dan 1-5
12. Tonny Claasen 4-dan 1-5.

The top six players qualify for next year's championship. SOS and SODOS scores were used to split ties. *(Report from Peter Dijkema)*

1987 Prague International Tournament

The 17th Prague International Tournament was held in early February and was won by Matthew Macfadyen (U.K.). Second was Petr Winkelhofer (Czech.), third P.Varga (Hungary), and fourth Vladimir Danek (Czech.).

The 1986 Czechoslovak Championship was held last August and was won by Vladimir Danek, who will represent his country in the 1988 WAGC. The 1987 representative is Jiri Sgall, the 1985-86 champion.

A Note from the Editor

Readers may be disappointed at not seeing the second instalment of the Iwamoto autobiography in this issue. The reason for its non-appearance is that we have decided to act upon the suggestion of some enthusiastic readers that the autobiography be published as a book. It will be made available by the Ishi Press next year.

The American Go Institute

The American Go Institute in Monterey Park, California is conducting go classes on a regular basis. Mr. Yang, a 6-dan professional from Shanghai, teaches a group of children as young as eight years old. Results from the past year have been impressive, with the children attaining levels of play of 2-kyu to 5-kyu. The Institute is now looking for additional students. For children in the area, this is a marvellous opportunity to develop their playing skills. The Institute is also considering setting up classes for adults. For more information contact Mr. James Chen at (213) 726-1242.

The U.S.A. representatives in this year's World Youth Championship are both pupils at the institute. They are Tony Pa 4-dan (age 16) and Allen Chen 4-dan (age 8).

News From Canada

1987 Montreal Honinbo Tournament

This is the main annual tournament in the Montreal area. The final round consists of a six-player round-robin league, which this year was won by Yuzo Ota 5-dan. He finished in a tie with Sachio Kohara (both scored 4-1), but won the playoff to become the challenger. Third place in the league was taken by Rene Donais 4-dan on 3-2 and 4th place by Khalid Benabdallah 4-dan, also on 2-2.

In the title match the defending champion Louis Leroux reconfirmed his status as the top Montreal player with two straight wins.

1987 Montreal Shodan Challenge Tournament

This tournament, now in its third year, is conducted for the next group of Montreal players while the top guns are competing in the above tournament. Fourteen players between 2-dan and 2-kyu competed, with Tibor Bogнар emerging as

Continued on page 58.

34th Oza Title Match

Rin Kaiho is indisputably one of the giants of the modern go scene, but since he lost the Honinbo title to Takemiya in 1985 he has not attracted much attention. He has maintained a secure place in both leagues, but has not been one of the front-runners. For a player who in the past grew accustomed to being number one,

this must be frustrating. His sole success in the past two years has been becoming the Oza challenger last year, but here he had the bad luck to run into Kato in peak form. Rin has held the Oza title just once, in 1973, whereas Kato has now set a record of five Oza titles in a row.

Game One

White: Kato Masao, Oza

Black: Rin Kaiho 9-dan

Komi: 5½; time: 6 hours each.

Played on 26 September 1986.

Commentary by Takemiya Masaki, Honinbo.

Exciting go

After losing five games in a row between July and September, it looks as if I have finally emerged from my slump just in time for the Kisei games — what a relief! For a while, I was really worried, but I'm sure that I'll soon be showing my old form once again.

Game One of the Oza Title Match is the most exciting contest I have seen for a long time. From start to finish, this is fighting go at its best, and both players show reading ability of a high order. This is what go is all about!

Perhaps because he has lost some of his former ability to calculate territory, Rin has become a 'fighting' player. And Kato, who at one time appeared to base his whole game on calculation, has also recently started playing extremely aggressive go, notably in the Meijin title. This is the way it should be.

Too many games nowadays consist simply of a cold computation of profit, like a miser counting his hoard. Possibly this is a reflection of the times we live in, but nevertheless I don't like it: such games leave me completely unmoved.

Fortunately, Kato and Rin are made of sterner stuff. At the risk of overpraising, I would say that this confrontation deserves to rank as one of the classic games of all time.

Figure (1 – 15). Kato style

White 10 is tighter than 'a' in the figure; Kato may have had a special strategy in mind. Black 11 also helps to set the tone of this





Figure 1 (1 – 15)



Dia. 1

game. An approach move in the upper left corner, or moves at 'b' or 'c', is equally feasible.

The invasion of White 12 is typical of Kato's strong fighting style.

Black 13, 15. Rin chooses to make sabaki, but considering Black's strength in this part of the board, I would prefer the sequence in Dia. 1. If Black jumps out with 1, White will probably counterattack with 2 and 4, but Black can fight easily with 5 and 7. Instead of 2, if White simply answers with a jump of his own at 4, Black takes the corner with 'a' or attaches at 'b'. This is a matter of taste; it would be hard to say which sequence is better.





Figure 2 (16 - 42)




Dia. 2

Figure 2 (16 - 42). Fighting spirit


White 16. Kyu-level players should note that playing the joseki sequence, as in Dia. 2, could be dangerous. If White adopts the nidan-bane pattern at 1, Black will attach on top of the white stone with 2, seeking a chance to utilize the aji of Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c'. With this to worry about, White will find it difficult to respond. Beware of automatically playing a sequence just because it is joseki.

White 18-22. White goes for thickness. Move 20 could have been at 23, connecting in the corner, but presumably this was not to Kato's liking.


Before playing the high approach at 24, Kato could have settled matters in the corner with White 'a', followed by Black 33 and White 37. Failure to play this forcing sequence may have been a major cause of Kato's later troubles. Once the fight had begun with Black's hane at 25, White had no time to play 'a'. Despite this slip on Kato's part, however, the struggle developed in a very interesting manner, both players showing considerable fighting skill.



Dia. 3



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

White 26 was unavoidable. If White cuts immediately at 1 in Dia. 3, Black simply blocks his escape and it's all over. The point of the exchange of moves up to Black's connection at 29 is to allow White to cut at 30. In view of this, for Black's 29th move, I would have gone back and connected at 1 in Dia. 4. If White cuts at 2, the tesuji of 3 is a perfect answer. And if White replaces 2 with a block from above at 'a', Black can be satisfied with the simple connection underneath after Black 'b', White 'c'. Nevertheless, it can't be denied that Rin's connection of 29 is a strong way of playing.

Black 33. Since White has failed to settle the corner, Black 33 is natural. Although White 34 captured two stones, Black was probably satisfied to have played on both sides with 35, 37, and 39.

Black 35. White can't afford a mistake in replying to this move. If he carelessly pushes

up at 1 in Dia. 5, Black will first play a forcing move at 2 and then pull out his two stones with 4. The sequence that follows is a one-way street, ending with White's collapse when his two pivotal stones are captured in a ladder. Thus White 36 was absolutely necessary.

Black 37. This could have been at 38 to take control of the lower right corner, but allowing White to block at 37 would have made move 33 meaningless.

The commentary seems to have concentrated on very detailed tactical sequences, but this only goes to show how difficult the game was for both players.





Figure 3 (43 - 68)




Dia. 6


Figure 3 (43 - 68). The fighting spreads.

Black 43. This extension was definitely in the right direction. If Black pulls back at 1 in Dia. 6, White's contact play at 2 puts him in trouble. Even if Black resists with the hane of 3 he is captured by the well-known two-stone squeeze tesuji after the sequence to 10.

Black 49, 53, etc. are undoubtedly strong moves worthy of Rin, but according to Rin himself, 45 before these was a mistake. This was



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

Black's chance to take profit with the kosumi of 1 in Dia. 7. Even though White gets to take a stone, Black can bridge under with 3, giving him profit in both lower corners. This is undeniably a consistent strategy. If White blocks the watari by descending to 'a' in place of 2, Black connects at 2, followed by White 'b' and Black 'c'. Black has every reason to be confident of his chances in the subsequent fighting.

White 46, 48. White first stakes his claim to part of the corner, and then connects with good timing at 52 in response to Black 49. Rin may have overlooked this move.

Dia. 8. The commonsense reply to Black 49 is the block at 1, but Black 4 gouges out White's base, leaving him without room for two eyes. The sequence from White 5 to Black 8 results in a ko, but Black has several excellent ko threats, starting with 'a'. In a fierce fight you can't rely on 'commonsense' moves.

Once White cuts with 54 and 56 the outcome is anybody's guess. As Black has based his strategy on taking definite territory, the spread of the fighting to other parts of the board is probably not to his liking, but it certainly makes for interesting go. At any rate, both players' stones now begin to fan out across the board.

Black 61. Black is forced to escape in the 'wrong' direction, and White 62 to 68 see Kato in fine attacking shape.

Oza Prize Money.

1st prize: ¥6,800,000 (about \$44,500); 2nd prize: ¥1,360,000. Match fee for title match — title holder: ¥1,900,000; challenger: ¥1,250,000.

The Oza title is the sixth-ranked of the seven open titles. The 2nd to the 15th titles were knockout tournaments with a best-of-three final. It changed to the challenger system from the 16th title on. From the 32nd term, the title match changed from best-of-three to best-of-five.




Figure 4 (69 - 100)





Figure 5 (101 - 170)



Dia. 9

Figure 4 (69 - 100). Rin undaunted

Being attacked by Kato is enough to frighten almost any player — but not Rin. Black 79 was played with confidence: it looks dangerous at first sight, but Rin must have known what he was doing. We should have faith in the players' reading ability.

Black 95 looks like bad style; I would like to have seen the 1-3 combination in Dia. 9. If White resists with 4 and 6, he suffers a major loss when Black breaks through and takes the right side with 7 to 11. If White replaces 4 with 'a', Black plays 'b': this is a much more elegant development for him.

Figure 5 (101 - 170). Black settles his group.

White 4. Kato was perhaps a little premature in settling the situation with 4; I would have preferred to leave open the possibility of White 'a', Black 65, White 5.

White, who is behind in definite territory,

sticks close to Black with 6 and 12, but due to the possibility of a cut by Black at 35, his attacking prospects are not so bright. Both players anticipate this brilliantly in their attack and defence. This game was truly a pleasure to watch.

Black 25 in response to the peep of White 24 is correct timing. If Black connects at 31 before playing 25, White would probably give up the two stones 12 and 14.

Black 37. After securing the life of his group by taking a hold on two stones, Black enters the upper left corner at the 3-3 point. Black's lead is narrow but definite. Unfortunately for Rin, however, he made a number of slack plays after this point. The first of these is Black 49. It seems to me that Black could pressure White with 'b' in the figure. Then there is the hane-tsugi of 65 and 67. If Black strengthens the right side in good shape with 'c', he will easily be able to survive any attack that White could launch. White 70 is a very troublesome move that brings the issue of the game into doubt once more.

Figure 6 (171 - 274). The lost chance

White 74. This was the losing move.

Dia. 10. Kato had the chance to turn the tables on Rin by simply extending to 1. If Black persists in trying to take the cutting stone as in the actual game, White gets ataris at both 11 and 13, allowing him to cut at 15 and kill half of Black's centre group. If Black plays 2 at 'a', White loses the four stones but is more





Figure 6 (171 – 274)
135: at 89; 174: connects (above 124)



Dia. 10

than compensated by extending at 3. This is good for White. As Black cannot afford to concede even a little more profit, he would be at a loss for an answer.

After all the fighting, Black won in the end by only half a point.

The games of Messrs. Rin and Kato give me great pleasure; they play go like men half their age.

Black wins by ½ point.

(‘Kido’, November 1986. Translated by Steve Lloyd.)

Two weeks after this game was played, on 9 October, Kato won the Meijin title from Kobayashi, which undoubtedly took his mind off his half-point loss here. Kato is the last

person in the go world to become conceited, but still he wasted no time asserting the authority of his new position.

Game Two

White: Rin Kaiho

Black: Kato Masao

Played at Tsurumaki spa in Kanagawa prefecture on 16 October 1986.




Figure 1 (1 – 50)

Figure 1 (1 – 50). Unorthodox moves

The first unusual move is White 24. If White plays at 45, Black will get ideal shape with ‘a’, White 27, Black 25. On the other hand, White 24 leaves the corner open at 27.

White 32 is a difficult point. White ‘b’ would give Black a perfect move at ‘c’ (perfect because Black ‘d’, aiming at ‘e’, is sente). The drawback of 32 is that Black can make a severe invasion at 33.

Black ignores 34, leading to an interesting exchange. White in turn ignores Black 39 – if White 40 at 45, Black defends at 43 and has gained.

White 46 is unusual: extending at 47 looks natural, but since that leaves White with a thin position Black might tenuki (switch elsewhere). Rin therefore defends patiently; he is aiming at the weak point of ‘f’.

Kato was playing just as fast as in the Meijin title. Up to 52 (next figure) he used only 32 minutes to Rin’s two hours 47 minutes.







Figure 2 (51 - 100)




Dia. 3




Dia. 4



Dia. 5



Dia. 1



Dia. 2 5: connects

Figure 2 (51 - 100). A large-scale sacrifice strategy

White 52. Necessary, though 53 is worth about 30 points. Black would get a lot of thickness if he cut at 62.

Black 61 and 63 probably took Rin by surprise. These moves invite White to split Black into two with 64; normally this would be very bad for Black, but he considers it an acceptable price to pay for living in sente with 65. In retrospect, it is clear that White should have followed Dia. 1 with 56. After 4, White can play 'a' in sente and also get a spare eye with 'b'.

Black 67 launches a large-scale sacrifice manoeuvre. His aim is to build thickness on the outside, which he succeeds in doing up to 83, before attacking at 85. White might be tempted to try to stop this by extending at 83 with 82, but then Black would live on the inside as in

Dia. 2.

White 86. A difficult decision. White could live as in Dia. 3, but he dislikes letting Black take territory in the centre. Alternatively, he could sacrifice the group as in Dia. 4, but that gives Black too much profit and is gote.

Black 87 and 89 are an aggressive follow-up to 85, but Black 91 is surprisingly mild. The players following the game had expected Black 1 in Dia. 5. If White tries to break through with 2 etc., Black holds him in with the 5-7 combination. If White 'a' after 13, Black 'b' keeps him down to one eye. White would have to try for a semeai (capturing race) with the centre black group, but it should be able to escape through the centre. Instead of 2 -

Dia. 6. White could live with 2 etc., but

Black will be able to use his centre thickness to attack the group on the top left.

White 92 takes the pressure off the white group, but Black is satisfied with the centre thickness he builds up to 97. White decides to take immediate steps to wipe out that thickness with 98.





Figure 3 (101 - 150)




Dia. 7

Figure 3 (101 - 150). Forced to make bad shape


White 2 is a tenacious move, but White 4 is slack. Instead White should follow Dia. 7.

Dia. 7. If White extends at 1, Black can save his stone above with 2, but then White can use the placement at 3 to force up to 9. After he lives with 11, Black will move out with 12. In this result, the 20 points of territory White has taken on the right side will prove their value, and White could be reasonably optimistic about his prospects.

When Black blocks at 5, White is forced to



Dia. 8



Dia. 9

make bad shape with 10, which is painful. If White plays 10 at 12, Black ataris at 10; if White answers at 'a', Black hanes at 13 and captures him.

White 18. Yet again White is forced to make bad shape: the tide of the game has turned against him. When Kato made the solid reinforcement at 19, he looked full of confidence. He had made quite a large reduction in White's bottom area.

Black 43 is necessary to forestall the sequence shown in Dia. 8. White could capture two stones up to 7 or play a ko with 5 at 'a', Black 'b', White 6.

White 46 is a tesuji. White 1 in Dia. 9 would be a mistake: Black counters with 2 and captures at least three stones after 8. If White 3 at 4, Black just plays 6.



Kato draws level.

Game Three

White: Kato Masao

Black: Rin Kaiho

Played on 5 Nov. 1986 at Minakami spa, Gumma prefecture. *Commentary by Ishida Yoshio 9-dan.*





Figure 4 (151 - 209)



Dia. 10

Figure 4 (151 - 209). *A group drops off.*

Black 61. By this time Kato had made his calculations and got the answer he wanted. It's disheartening for the opponent to see a move like this, for it amounts to a declaration of victory.

White 72 and Black 73 are miai.

Black 85. The vital point.

White 96 is a mistake: White had to follow Dia. 10 to live. However, this would leave him ten points behind.

Black 97 cuts off the group and brings the game to a premature end.

The highlight of this game was Kato's farseeing sacrifice strategy on the right side. Apart from his one slack move at 91 in Figure 2, he displayed his strength to the full.

White resigns after Black 209.

Time taken. White: 5 hours 59 minutes.

Black: 4 hours 2 minutes.

(Adapted from a commentary in the Nihon Keizai newspaper.)






Figure 1 (1 - 58)



Dia. 1




Dia. 2

Figure 1 (1 - 58). *To force or not to force?*

The fuseki to 8 is the same as in the fourth game of the Meijin title match (see GW47). Rin gives his seal of approval to the narrow move of 7, Kobayashi's revision of his own fuseki pattern.

Black 13 goes for profit. The alternative joseki, in which Black opts for influence, is shown in Dia. 1. However, this pattern would make better balance at the bottom if Black 7 in the figure were at 'a'.

The continuation to 24 looks like the standard joseki, but there's something not quite right. The 21-22 exchange is not part of the joseki. If Black simply plays 21 at 23, he can aim at breaking up White's corner with 1 etc. in Dia. 2. Even if he doesn't follow this diagram, Black could at least capture a stone by cutting at 22.



Dia. 3


Just why Rin played 21 is a mystery.

Black 49 looks natural, but actually it lets slip an opportunity to take the lead. Black 1 in Dia. 3 would be very effective. If 2 to 5, White must next live with 6 and 8, so Black can then seal him in on the edge with 9. White will probably reduce the moyo with 10, but Black is happy to push along with 11 and 13. (If White 4 at 'a', Black jumps to 'b'.)


The point of Dia. 3 is that Black 3 there preempts White 50 in the figure. The sequence to 58, in which both sides rope off centre territory, actually favours White. Black has a big invasion point at 'b', but it is surpassed by the White 'c-d' combination.

Black could forestall White 'c' by forcing with 'e', but there is a reason why he wants to keep it in reserve.

Dia. 4. Black 1 aims at 'a'. If White blocks with 2, Black puts the corner into ko with 3 and 5, a ko, moreover, in which it is his turn to capture first.



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

Figure 2 (59 – 100). *Rin loses the initiative.*

Black 59, forestalling White 89, is big, but White seizes the opportunity to peep at 60. Black's counter is the tesuji of 61, but he is forced to give up two stones. If he played 65 at




Figure 2 (59 – 100)

66, White 75 would cut up this end of the moyo. The end result is that keeping open the aji of Dia. 4 has backfired. This example proves the truth of the observation that amateurs suffer because of erasing aji and professionals from reluctance to do so.

Black 69 aims at attacking the three white stones, but White just reinforces with two forcing moves before switching elsewhere.

White 72. The last move before lunch. Kato was playing as fast as ever – 51 minutes so far to Rin's two hours 5 minutes.

White 76 not only keeps in check the black moyo to the right but also helps the white stones on the bottom left by attacking Black 59.

Black 87 is the wrong answer to 86 – Rin made a bad misreading here. Black 85 was aiming at the cut at 'a', but White 88 defends against that cut. If Black plays 89 at 1 in Dia. 5, White counters with 2 etc.; Black has no answer to the cut at 8. White 8 at 'a' would be bad because of Black 'b'. The correct move for 87 was descending at 'b' in the figure, though that would have been followed by a very complicated fight.

Black is forced to flee with 89 and 93, and in the course of pursuing him White moves into his moyo. Rin fell a little behind here, so Ishida called 87 the losing move. All the same, the path to victory for White after this was a perilous one.

Black 97 revives the threat of 'a', but Black doesn't get a chance to play there – he is kept too busy trying to hang on to his moyo.




Figure 3 (101 - 150)
28: connects; ko: 43, 48




Figure 4 (151 - 200)
Ko: 54, 57, 60, 63, 66, 69, 72

Figure 4 (151 - 200). The game is decided.

White 70 eliminates the ko threats Black has against this group. Black 71, defending against White 75, is now the biggest move, but White goes back to the ko. In exchange for finishing it off, he permits Black 73 and 77. Half of White's moyo at the top is wiped out as a consequence, but apparently Kato decided way back that this was an acceptable price to pay for winning the ko. As he correctly calculated, his lead came through unscathed. Only ordinary endgame now remains.

Black 77 is fated to be captured, but a kosumi at 81 would make no difference: White 80, Black 83, White 84.




Figure 3 (101 - 150). Rin's last chance

Black 5 is a quiet answer to a dangerous move. If Black confronted White 4 head-on by blocking at 1 in Dia. 6, a ko would follow after 2 to 8. Black doesn't have enough threats to win it.

Black 7. Black doesn't atari at 47 as he is aiming at Black 27.

Black 19. Black 'a' is worth more but it gives White an extra ko threat.

Black 27 represents Rin's last chance of turning the game around. However, the best he can get is a two-move approach-move ko.

White 34 looks timid, as White could set up another ko here with 1 to 5 in Dia. 7 (Black could hardly give way with 2), but Black now has ko threats against the White group on the bottom left; also, if Black won this ko and captured at 'a', that would reduce White's liberties at the top.

Black 39. If at 47 first, White sets up a double ko with White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd'.

White 46. Since it's an approach-move ko, White takes some extra profit while fighting it.




Figure 6 (201 - 266)



Kato goes ahead and Rin wonders what to do about it.

Figure 5 (201 – 266). Two decisive mistakes

White 2, 4. A clever combination that stops Black from getting any territory here.

White 18. Black never got a chance to atari at 'a'.

Rin went wrong at two decisive points in this game (49 in Figure 1 and 87 in Figure 2) and that cost him his chances of winning.

White wins by 8½ points.

Time taken. White: 4 hours 40 minutes.

Black: 5 hours 59 minutes.

(Adapted from the Nihon Keizai newspaper.)

Game Four

White: Rin Kaiho

Black: Kato Masao

Played on 17 November at the Nihon Ki-in.

Commentary by Kato Masao.

Figure 1 (1 – 33). Both sides satisfied

With 19, I could also have played the kosumi at 20. After White 19, Black 'a', I'm not sure what would have happened. I answered peacefully at 19, permitting White 20, because I wanted to switch to the large points of 21 and 23 at the top.




Figure 1 (1 – 33)

White 24, forestalling Black 'b', is big.

White 32 is solid. Without it, Black has the aji of Black 32, White 'c', Black 'd', followed by a squeeze. So long as this threat remains, White cannot fight without constraint in the vicinity. Once he has reinforced with 32, White 'e' becomes a plausible threat.

However, Black 33 looks like the last large fuseki point, so Black is also satisfied.





Figure 2 (34 - 58)



Dia. 1

Dia. 2

Figure 2 (34 - 58). *Too easygoing*


White 40. White tenukis on the right because he considers 34 to 38 to have succeeded as forcing moves. With 40, White gets an impressive fuseki.

Black 45. Perhaps I should have dropped back to 1 in Dia. 1. The moves to 7 look like an effective strategy.


Black 53. Attacking here feels right. Fleeing with 1 in Dia. 2 is bad, as it just invites White to make a 'leaning' attack (motare) with 4.

Black 55 is the wrong timing. Black must first play 1 and 3 in Dia. 3. If White 4, then Black 5 now easily settles the group.

I underestimated the severity of White 58. Once White jumps here, looking after the black group is far from easy. I had expected White 1



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

5: connects

in Dia. 4, a move which held no fears for me. I was just too easygoing.




Figure 3 (59 - 82)


Figure 3 (59 - 82). *A desperation measure*

Black 59 and 61 are purposeless moves: they should be held in reserve.

White 62 is the vital point: it stops Black from making eye shape. With 63 and 65, Black has already resolved to sacrifice the group if he has to.

White 66. If White comes through at 1 in Dia. 5, Black forces with 2 to 6, then dodges to 8. White captures the group with 9, but Black gets an adequate result by breaking through the corner formation with 10 to 14. Note that Black 8 is an important move — if Black blocks at 11 instead, White cuts at 9 and it's all over.

With 66, White has a try at spoiling Black's shape, but attaching at 'a' would also have been a strong move.



Black 67. Black could attempt to save the group with 1 in Dia. 6, but giving White the excellent move of 2 is not interesting. If Black 3, White resolutely plays 4 to 10; after Black 11, White's contact play at 2 proves its usefulness and White has no trouble looking after his corner group with 12 to 16. Yet —

Dia. 7. If Black nimbly skips out with 3 to 7, White seizes hold of the bottom area up to 8, not a pleasant development for Black.

For all these reasons, I decided to sacrifice the group on the left side. 'Sacrifice' sounds good — to be more honest, the group was taken away from me.

The game already looks close on the board. As far as territory itself is concerned, the two sides are closely matched — Black is behind to the extent of the white thickness in the centre.




Figure 4 (83 – 116). *A successful squeeze*

Black has to pin his hopes on turning the centre into a worthless area, that is, on preventing White from turning his thickness into territory.

White 90, aiming at the peep at 'a', is an extremely big move. Black 91 seeks to create





Figure 4 (83 – 116)



some aji in the corner.

White 94. If White 1 and 3 in Dia. 8, I intended to cut at 4 and pull back at 6. Black takes endgame profit in sente. Instead of 6 —

Dia. 9. Black could rescue the black group inside with 1 and 3, but after White 8 Black is forced to descend at 9. Black ends in gote and his profit is not impressive.

White 98. If at 101, White will have much more at stake in the ko than Black.

Black can't live after the hane at 100, but he can aim at squeezing White.

White 106. White would probably like to jump to 1 in Dia. 10, but Black 2 is nasty. When Black blocks at 4, there are various kinds of unpleasant aji he can aim at. Black can atari at 'a', then play Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd'; or he could simply hane at 'e' and take aim at White's shortage of liberties.

Black 107. Note that in this squeeze Black is always aiming at 'b'. If you compare the result to 116 here to Dia. 11, which shows the ordinary endgame sequence, the conclusion is that Black has gained at least five points. Perhaps Rin

overlooked this endgame manoeuvre. All the same, Black is still a long way from catching up.






Figure 3 (117 - 139)



Dia. 12




Dia. 13

Figure 5 (117 - 139). *An unfriendly contact play*


Black attacks with 17 in the hope of creating complications, but White replies with the most unfriendly contact play of 18. Usually White would play 1 in Dia. 12; in the continuation to 6 White's centre thickness disappears and the game looks like becoming close. Or if White played 1 and 3 in Dia. 13, Black could answer at 4 for what looks like a similar result.

I had trouble finding an answer to the clever move of 18. If Black 19 at 22, White cuts at 21 and ataris at 20; Black will feel that he's been caught in a trap. However, the way I actually played from 19 on was perhaps a little slack. I thought of attacking at 1 in Dia. 14, but this gives White a good chance to play 2 and 4; it's no fun to see White slide into the top area with 6. Looking back now, it occurs to me that Black 1 in Dia. 15 would be a good move.


Dia. 15. Once Black has played 1, Black 'a'




Dia. 14



Dia. 15



Dia. 16



Dia. 17

becomes a big move, so White must exchange 2 for 3. In the continuation to 9, White's centre thickness disappears, and the game begins to look quite close. The ways things worked out in the game, I was clearly outplayed by Rin.

Black 29. What do you think would happen if Black used this move to escape with 25? I mean Black 1 in Dia. 16. The answer is that he is neatly trapped by White 2 and 4. Even if before fleeing he were to throw in a cut at 1 in Dia. 17 in order to lead White into shortage of liberties, that doesn't change anything.

Black 35. If at 39, White will hane at 'a'. Black 35 to 39 offer the maximum possible resistance.

Figure 6 (140 - 161). *A disturbance in front of the goal*

White 42 and 44 were so big that I thought I'd go out of my mind. When Rin aggressively placed these stones on the board, I thought, to be honest, that it was all up with me. At the least, I'd been hoping that Rin would enclose the centre with 42 at 1 in Dia. 18; I could then have hane at 2 and would have had an outside chance . . . Even if White locks up the centre with 3 and 5, the game remains fairly close. That's how big Black 2 is.





Figure 6 (140 - 161)




Dia. 18

White 46. White 'a' also looks good, but 46 is a severe move aiming at separating White with 'b'. If Black wants to defend against that threat, then attaching at 'c' is the move, but then he would lose when White attached at 'a'. Black 47 is, in its way, a do-or-die move: Black wants to probe White's reaction before defending at 'c'.


White 48 is the first step down the slope towards White's fall. White persists in aiming at 'b', but following Dia. 19 would be simpler. Even though White gives up four stones by letting Black cut at 6, he secures the centre by defending at 7, and his win remains secure. If Black 8, White holds him back with 9.

When Black pokes his head into the centre with 53, the game is thrown into confusion. Aiming at 'b' has backfired on White.

White 56 is the losing move. White can't omit 58 after Black 57, but then Black extends at 59, threatening the white groups above and below. If



Dia. 19




Dia. 20

White had played 56 at 1 in Dia. 20, the white group below would have been safe. If Black 2, White can link up with 3 and 5; if Black 2 at 3, White plays 'a'; if Black 2 at 'b', White plays 3 — in each case he is able to link up. Incidentally, there was a theory that White could have defended at 'b' with 1, but I think that would place the group above in danger, as Black's peep at 3 would be sente.

White 60. If White plays 1 in Dia. 21 (next page) to secure the group below, Black can play 2 and 4; after White 7, Black 8 works perfectly. Linking up with White 1 at 'a' is also conceivable, but then Black 'b' will be sente against the group above, so Black can then use the hanekomi of 1 to cut off the group below, as the reader can confirm for himself.

Black 61 puts White on the spot — if White 'd', Black cuts him off with 'e'.

Capturing this group caused an immediate upset. The fact that Rin was down to his last minute of byo-yomi seems to have been fatal for him.



Dia. 21

Figure 7 (162 – 222). *Hoping for a grand slam*

Thanks to winning the Oza title for five years in a row (the first time it's been done), I earned the degree of Honorary Oza. This is my first 'honorary' title and I feel very happy about it. This is also my seventh Oza title, so I have caught up with Sakata. The next target is ten.

I take a more-than-average interest in records. As far as personal records go, I've now won the Judan title for a total of five terms, which puts me level with Sakata in this title too, and my four terms as Tengen are a record, though of course this title hasn't been around so long. In




Figure 7 (162 – 222)

overall tournament victories, I now have 24, which puts me in 4th place. Here catching up with Sakata's 64 is out of the question.

Next, it might be nice to make a comeback in the Judan, the way Takemiya did in the Honinbo. The record that is closest to my heart, of course, is scoring the grand slam of the seven open titles. For that, I have to win the Kisei.

Black wins by 6½ points.

Time taken, White: 5 hours 59 minutes.

Black: 3 hours 59 minutes.

('Kido', January 1987. Games 2 to 4 translated by John Power.)

Japan v. China

The presentation of this game has been a little delayed, but we hope that readers will feel that it was worth waiting for. It is the clash between Kato and Nie, playing on Board 1 for their countries, in the 14th Japan–China Go Exchange, which took place last year. As reported in detail in GW44 (page 3), a Chinese team toured Japan from 27 April to 18 May in 1986 and performed very creditably against Japan, scoring 31 wins to 25 losses. The teams the Japanese fielded last year were far from the strongest they could have mustered, but they did include two title-holders in Kato and Takemiya. One can only look forward to the day the Japanese really put their honour on the line

by fielding a team made up of their top ten players (the only objective guide to which is prize money totals).

The Chinese take these tours very seriously and consider them excellent opportunities to gain experience. Last year Nie, Ma and Kong were seeded in the team on the basis of past results, and a six-week tournament was held in Beijing in January and February to select the other five members. Surprisingly, such familiar figures as Liu Xiaoguang and Jiang Jiuzhu failed to make the team this time, which shows how fierce the competition was.

The highlight of the tour once again was the individual best-of-three matches incorporated in

the team matches. In these the Japanese just barely kept their flag flying by scoring an 8–8 tie. Most important for Japan, Kato, who was later to be selected as the outstanding player of the year by *Kido*, managed to come out on top in his encounter with Nie. The score of 2–1 in his favour accurately reflects the relative merit of their play, but the results of the first two games should have been reversed. Kato had a better game in the first game, given here, and Nie should have had a win in the second (given in the *1987 Ranka Yearbook*). In the heat of battle, even the world's top players can display a surprising frailty.

White: Kato Masao, Oza

Black: Nie Weiping 9-dan

Played on 29 April 1986 at the Nihon Ki-in.

Commentary by Kato.

Figure 1 (1 – 50). *A good start for Kato*

White 18, 20. The indirect method for covering White's weak point at 'a'.

Black 31 is a bold strategy – too bold, for it seems to cause Black to fall behind. It helps White to solidify his position on the side, which in turn makes 18 and 10 light. Kato suggested that 'b' was superior. If Black played 'c' before 31 to 37, White would have to answer with White 'd', Black 'e', White 'f', but after the exchange on the side he would just ignore Black 'c'.





Figure 1 (1 – 50)



Dia. 1

White 38 to 42 make the game close on the board.

Black 49 is a good move. White 50 defends against the cut shown in Dia. 1. If White has a stone at 'a', he can cut at 'b' after 7.

14th Japan-China Go Exchange (1986)

Player	29 April	1 May	5 May	7 May	10 May	13 May	15 May	Score
Nie	Kato won: R	Kato lost: R	Kato lost: 4 $\frac{1}{2}$	Takemiya lost: 3 $\frac{1}{2}$	Hane won: 1 $\frac{1}{2}$	Hane won: 9 $\frac{1}{2}$	Shiraishi won: 6 $\frac{1}{2}$	4 – 3
Ma	Kobayashi S. won: 2 $\frac{1}{2}$	Kobayashi won: $\frac{1}{2}$	Sakai lost: R	Ishigure lost: R	Sonoda lost: R	Sonoda won: R	Sonoda lost: R	3 – 4
Tsao	Kudo won: R	Kudo lost: R	Kudo won: R	Kojima won: R	Hashimoto S. won: 2 $\frac{1}{2}$	Hashimoto lost: 4 $\frac{1}{2}$	Hashimoto lost: R	4 – 3
Kong	Tokimoto lost: 6 $\frac{1}{2}$	Tokimoto won: R	Tokimoto lost: 8 $\frac{1}{2}$	Nakamura H. won: R	Sakaguchi lost: 3 $\frac{1}{2}$	Sakaguchi won: 6 $\frac{1}{2}$	Sakaguchi lost: 5 $\frac{1}{2}$	3 – 4
Shao	Sakai lost: 1 $\frac{1}{2}$	Sakai lost: R	Sonoda won: R	Sato M. won: R	Shiraishi won: 6 $\frac{1}{2}$	Shiraishi won: 5 $\frac{1}{2}$	Kubo won: $\frac{1}{2}$	5 – 2
Rui	Kanno lost: 1 $\frac{1}{2}$	Kanno won: 2 $\frac{1}{2}$	Kanno won: 5 $\frac{1}{2}$	Aragaki lost: R	Kubo won: R	Kubo won: 3 $\frac{1}{2}$	Hane lost: 2 $\frac{1}{2}$	4 – 3
Qian	Miyazawa won: R	Miyazawa lost: R	Miyazawa lost: R	Kamimura H. lost: 3 $\frac{1}{2}$	Hikozaaka lost: $\frac{1}{2}$	Hikozaaka won: 5 $\frac{1}{2}$	Hikozaaka lost: R	2 – 5
Wang Q.	Sonoda won: 1 $\frac{1}{2}$	Sonoda won: R	Kobayashi S. won: $\frac{1}{2}$	Fukui S. won: R	Kori lost: R	Kori won: R	Kori won: R	6 – 1
Result	5 – 3	4 – 4	4 – 4	4 – 4	4 – 4	7 – 1	3 – 5	31 – 25





Figure 2 (51 - 100)



Dia. 2


Figure 2 (51 - 100). *Kato ahead*

Black 59. Usually one would expect Black 60, but Nie disliked the idea of a white hane at 59.

White 74. The first move Kato regretted. He wished that he had followed Dia. 2. If Black cuts at 2, White plays 3 and 5, then jumps to 7 at the top. The five points or so of territory White gets (around 1) is big; this would maintain White's lead.

Black 75-83. Played to ensure that Black can get an eye at 'a' if he needs it. If Black attacks immediately with 85 to 89, White catches the group with 1 to 11 in Dia. 3.

Black 85. Black can't match White in territory, so he has to attack the centre group. With 91 etc., he walls off the top, but he has to come back to reinforce his own group with 99 before he can continue the attack. Black 99 at 'b' also



Dia. 3

4: connects

looks possible, but actually it would make it easier for White by giving him 'c'.




Figure 3 (101 - 150)

Figure 3 (101 - 150). *Kato attacked by nerves*


White 32. A timid move that Kato bitterly regretted. White should have at 1 in Dia. 4. This leads to a semeai (capturing race) with the group at the top, but White easily wins it. Therefore, instead of 4 -

Dia. 5. Black has to cut at 1. After 6, Black adds a stone to live at the top and White captures at 'a'. The game would be over. If instead Black keeps on trying to capture White, that is -


Dia. 6. If Black continues with 7, he loses the semeai after 14.

White 34. Another mistake - White 1 in Dia. 7 is correct. Black has to play 4 if he wants to kill the group, but then he loses his own centre group. That means that Black can't attempt to capture the centre white group. Kato missed another chance to wrap up the game.


White 42. Yet another mistake. Kato was




Dia. 4
12: at 3



Dia. 5




Dia. 6




Dia. 7

already in byo-yomi, but that hardly accounts for his bad play in this figure. The only explanation is that he was overcome by the pressure of representing his country on the top



Dia. 8



Dia. 9

board.

For 42, White 1 in Dia. 8 is the only move. The continuation is complicated but entertaining. White secures two eyes at the top by sacrificing two stones. Black has to play 12 and 14 next to save his group to the right, then 16 to save the group below. Kato didn't follow this diagram because he disliked giving up the two stones at the top. He was still aiming at attacking the black group.




Figure 4 (151 - 229)

Figure 4 (151 - 229). Finally, the losing move

Despite all these mistakes, White still has the lead, but with 52 he finally throws it away irrevocably. White captures six stones, but he has lost the group on the top left outright. Moreover, Black gets to play 53 in sente. This completely upsets White's lead. If instead he had followed Dia. 9, he would still have won. White loses the semeai shown here, but he squeezes in sente and can switch to 'a' in the figure.

Kato is ten points behind on the board when he resigns. He must have been shaken by this reverse. Otake commented: 'If you lose a game that was this good for you, you can't expect to win any game.' Fortunately for Japan, Kato turned the tables in the next game.

White resigns after Black 229.

Here is another game from the tour, played between a former World Amateur Champion (1981) and the director of the Overseas Department of the Nihon Ki-in. Shao of China lost his match against Sakai, but won all his other games on the tour. The Chinese refer to Sakai as 'the Japanese Jiang', for the reason that although he hasn't taken any titles, Sakai does very well in international matches (against Chinese players he has scored 11-2 to date, his only losses being to Nie and Ma). Jiang 8-dan of China does not do very well in Chinese tournaments but he was one of the stars of the 1st Japan-China Super Go series.

White: Shao Zhenzhong 7-dan

Black: Sakai Takeshi 9-dan

Played on 1 May 1986 at the Nihon Ki-in.




Figure 1 (1 - 50)

Figure 1 (1 - 50)

Black 23 is a little cheeky. Black 'a' would be safer, but Sakai didn't want White to link up underneath with 'b'. Up to 33 Black succeeds in his aim of splitting up White's bottom area.

Figure 2 (51 - 100)

Black 69. Better to pull back at 70.

White 84. A good move - Sakai had expected




Figure 2 (51 - 100)

Shao to hane at 97, after which Black 91 would win the semeai.

White 92. Another good move: White gets an approach-move ko.




Figure 3 (101 - 149)

Ko: 6, 13, 44, 47

Figure 3 (101 - 149)

White 16 should have been at 23. Shao thought 16 was sente, but Sakai surprised him with 17, which put him in the lead again.

White 26. Better at 39, which would keep White in the game. Black 37 is decisive. Soon after, Black ends the ko, and the game is over.

Moves 150 to 187 omitted. White resigns.

(Translated from the Yomiuri by John Power.)

12th Tengen Title

1986 was a year of great ups and downs for Kobayashi Koichi. He couldn't have made a better start to the year than by defeating his main rival Cho Chikun in the Kisei title, but he sank to the depths in the autumn when Kato unceremoniously wrested the Meijin title out of his grasp without ceding him even one victory with which to save face. The Tengen title match started with Kobayashi apparently still demoral-

ized, to judge from the easy time Sonoda had in the first game, but then there came an upturn in his fortunes and he finished the year in fine style with three straight wins to defend his title.

The first game of the title match was given in our previous issue. Here are the other three, concluding with Kobayashi's own commentary on the final game.

Game Two

White: Kobayashi Koichi, Kisei, Judan & Tengen

Black: Sonoda Yuichi 9-dan (Kansai Ki-in)

Played on 28 November in Shimabara, Kyushu.

Commentary by Kudo Norio 9-dan.





Figure 1 (1 – 50)

Figure 1 (1 – 50). *Laying waste to the moyo*

Black 13. Kobayashi: 'Sonoda had a lot of surprises for me. This was not only the first time I'd had 13 played against me, it was also the first time I'd even seen it.' Needless to say, Black 13 is related to Black 11. The instinctive reaction of most players would be to counter with 1 to 7 in Dia. 1, but Kobayashi single-mindedly goes for territory up to 18. Actually, playing like this takes just as much courage as following a centre strategy like Black's.

White 32 is perfectly timed – if Black added another stone, it would be too late to invade the moyo. Capturing a stone with Black 27 to 31 looked good, but perhaps it clashed with the



Dia. 1

Dia. 2

spirit of Black's fuseki. Better would have been playing 27 at 1 in Dia. 2. As will be seen later, the weakness here is a crucial defect in Black's moyo and unless he defends it he is handicapped in resisting any invasion of his moyo. Kobayashi said that he would have answered 1 with White 2 and 4. Black could then switch to 'a' in the figure. If White later invaded at 'a' in this diagram, Black could answer at 'b', and since he has such a strong wall to the right White would probably be unable to live.

Black 33. With the gap at 'b', Black can't hope to kill the invader.

Black 37 makes bad shape: it shows that Sonoda is making a serious attempt to catch White – he couldn't have read the comment above. Normally the only move that would occur to a professional here is connecting at 40, but obviously Sonoda lacked confidence in his prospects after White links up with White 37, Black 43, White 'c'. None of the professionals following the game predicted 37, but a reporter saw it coming.

White 46. This time Kobayashi surprises the spectators. White would still be able to save his group if he connected at 49, but cutting at 46 is more interesting.





Figure 2 (51 – 100)

Ko: 55, 58; 63: connects; 66: connects



Dia. 3

Dia. 4

Figure 2 (51 – 100). Kobayashi is confident.

Black 53 lets White cut at 54, but Black can't hope to continue the fight if he doesn't connect here. Since the bottom was originally black territory, almost any ko threat will be big enough for White.

Black 59 is a mistake; White promptly forces with 60 and 62, then ends the ko. Even after Black plays his follow-up move at 69, he has very bad aji at the bottom. Black 1 in Dia. 3 would have been a better ko threat. If White 2, Black's result after 12 is superior to the game. He may not be ahead, but at least the game is a lot closer.

White wastes no time in exploiting Black's bad aji with 70 and 72.

Black 75. Black has no choice: he can hardly answer at 78. The result to 78 is a great success for White, for he has transformed black moyo into white territory. The only way to avoid giving up the black stones would be follow Dia. 4 with 73, but this lets White break up the corner.

White doesn't have eyes yet, but if Black answers 10 at 'a', White plays 'b', forcing Black 'c', then blocks at 'd'.

White 88. White rejects the invitation to play a ko.

White 94. Extremely tight – Kobayashi must already have been confident of victory.

Black 95. The group is already alive, so Black could try to enclose the centre, but if he does White will expand his top area at the same time. Simply enclosing territory is not a good policy when you're behind. Black 95 and 97 not only eliminate White's sente moves against this group but also make his position thin.





Figure 3 (101 – 165)

Ko: 35, 38, 41, 44, 47; 49: connects (at 32)



Dia. 5


Figure 3 (101 – 165). Sonoda almost catches up.

White 2. Kobayashi follows up his conservative moves of 98 and 100 in Figure 2 with a move that's just a little too wide. White 2 at 6 would make it harder for Black to come in. Black 3 etc. not only limit White's territory but also suddenly conjure up a large black territory in the centre.

White 12 is bigger than it looks. If omitted, Black can make a big dent in White's territory



Kobayashi's coolness and accurate calculation contained the aggression of Sonoda.



Dia. 6

with the attack in Dia. 5. This is where Black's patient play with 95 in Figure 2 pays off. However, 22 keeps White a little ahead.

Black 31 is a fighting move. Presumably Sonoda calculated that connecting at 32 would have lost. However, Kobayashi calculated that giving way with 42 maintained a very small lead.

White 52 and 54 are, in effect, White's compensation for the ko.

Black 61 should be at 'a', but Sonoda made a mistake in analysis here. He had intended to continue after 62 with 1 and 3 in Dia. 6, but now he realized that White could capture the group with 4 to 14. He switched to 63 to make sure that Black 'b' would be sente, but provoking White 64 loses him his sente endgame move at 'c'. After all his hard work to narrow the gap (apparently he had got to within half a point), he let White draw ahead again.

Figure 4 (166 – 229). *Water prevails over fire.*

This game was notable for two things: the coolness and accuracy of Kobayashi's positional judgement and the never-say-die fighting spirit of Sonoda. Kobayashi kept the lead throughout,




Figure 4 (166 – 229)

but at times it was by the slightest of margins. For his part, Sonoda refused to give up: he took every opportunity to challenge Kobayashi, only to find his attacks cleverly parried. In the Japanese metaphor, the coolness of water prevailed over the heat of fire.

White wins by 3½ points.

Time taken. White: 5 hours 3 minutes.

Black: 5 hours 59 minutes.

(Adapted from the Tokyo Shimbun.)



Sonoda gave it everything he had, but he couldn't bring it off.

The next game was the key game of the series. In 80% of the Tengen title matches to date, the player winning the third game after a 1–1 start

has gone on to win the series. Sonoda had the disadvantage of competing in Kobayashi's hometown in Hokkaido, where all the locals must have been rooting for the title-holder. The game turned out to be Kobayashi's most convincing win of the series.

Game Three

White: Sonoda Yuichi

Black: Kobayashi Koichi

Played on 3 December 1986 in Asahikawa City, Hokkaido. *Commentary by Fujisawa Shuko.*




Figure 1 (1 - 41)


Figure 1 (1 - 41). *Sonoda unhappy with his fuseki*

Black 7, 9. A joseki Sonoda never plays. He says: 'I'd like to eradicate this clumsy joseki.' If he dislikes it so much, he should be happy to see his opponent play it.


White 18. By now the reader will recognize this as the inimitable Sonoda style. Note that up to 20, all of Kobayashi's stones are on the third line and all but one of Sonoda's on the fourth or higher.

White 26. A difficult decision for Sonoda. He commented that if he had played 32 instead, pushing Black into the centre, his moyo at the bottom would have disappeared. Kobayashi agreed, but not Shuko. The latter thought that White 32 was the only move here. His proposal was to play 1 to 5 in Dia. 1, then to block Black's path with 7. White 1 to 5 serve to reduce Black's moyo potential on the right side.

White 28. By this stage Sonoda was already



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

very unhappy with his fuseki. He didn't think that 28 was good, but he didn't want to play at 1 in Dia. 2 because Black can push along at 2. Shuko, however, thought that he had no choice but to follow this diagram. Permitting Black 2 feels bad, but White just has to answer patiently with 3 to 7.

White 30. Sonoda: 'Perhaps I should have made a shoulder hit at 'a'. I was aware that Black's counter at 31 made 30 unreasonable.' Shuko: 'White should just flee into the centre with 'b'.'

Black 35 is a well-timed answer to 34. White has no choice but to give way with 36 to 40. A similar pattern often arises in handicap go (with the colours reversed) and is considered satisfactory for White. The crucial difference here is that he loses three stones on the outside instead of the usual two.

Figure 2 (42 - 100). *Kobayashi in fine form*

White 44 looks good.— White has to take care of his stones at the top without hurting his moyo at the bottom — but Black has a very severe counter prepared with 45 and 47.





Figure 2 (42 - 100)




Dia. 3

Kobayashi: 'I can't afford to slacken off in this position. If I ease the pressure by playing 45 at 48, White will make the shoulder hit at 'a' and the lead will be up for grabs. I thought that 45 and 47 were the only moves to make life tough for White.' Black 49 seems to make bad shape, but this is the strongest strategy.


Black 51. Quite a move, according to Shuko. It takes courage to peep at a cutting point, but in this case cutting would not be good. Kobayashi: '[When I started this attack] I intended to cut at 1 in Dia. 3, but on thinking about it a bit more carefully, I realized that White might switch to 4. This move works perfectly. Black can't expect to take all the top area, so this way he might lose. Once you decide not to cut, it's obviously better to destroy White's eye shape by peeping.'

Black 55 may look slow, but it's the most effective way of stopping White from linking up.

White 58. Sonoda decides that he has to compromise. The most aggressive answer to 57 is 1 in Dia. 4, but then Black's cut at 8 will be severe. White will have to sacrifice two centre



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

stones.

White 62. If at 65, Black continues with Black 62, White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd', Black 'e', sealing White in. His group on the side would have little chance of surviving. The furikawari to 66 therefore seems inevitable. The pressure on White is removed when he joins up his two weak groups, but the 'tail' of the group that he sacrificed at the top is too big. Black is leading.

White 70. White needs to make a lot of territory at the bottom to match Black's 50 points at the top. However, the exchange of 72 for 73 was criticized as helping Black (it makes it easy for him to play 81). White 1 in Dia. 5 was proposed as an alternative. After 2 and 4, White counters with 5; even though White has bad aji, this would have made the game closer. However, Kobayashi concluded after examining this variation that if he continued with 6 to 10 (before which Black exchanges 77 for 78), he would still have won.

Black 77. Black would play 'f' if he were behind.

White 80 should be at 'g' — Black 81 makes his lead even more tangible.





Figure 3 (101 - 153)
22: connects (left of 14)



Dia. 6

Figure 3 (101 - 153). A game Sonoda will want to forget

Black 33. Not a mistake: Kobayashi is aiming at the cut at 'a'. The aji of 'a' clinches the game.

White 52. If at 1 in Dia. 6, Black plays 2 in sente, then cuts at 4. White has no answer.

The source of Sonoda's troubles in this game was his overplays at 26, 28, and 30 in Figure 1. These moves became a burden on him and handicapped him from the outset. Shuko commented: 'Sonoda displayed none of his usual creativity . . . When you lose your rhythm, things just go from bad to worse.'

White resigns after Black 153.

Time taken. White: 4 hours 14 minutes.

Black: 3 hours 6 minutes.

(Adapted from the Tokyo Newspaper.)

Game Four

Rising again from the depths

One should forget the past and treat each game as a fresh start — I realized this full well, but my shut-out in the Meijin title match was still a shock. I also lost my Honinbo league game [to O Rissei] immediately after the Meijin title match, and before I had time to rebuild my tottering position the Tengen title match started and I was wiped out in the first game. I had lost six games in a row. I was feeling pretty unhappy with life. Losing and being stripped of a title was something that couldn't be helped; it was the way I lost that was painful. When you lose a game without having been able to bring all your strength to bear, it leaves you with a feeling of frustration. I was once again made painfully aware of my immaturity and at the same time I gained a new appreciation of just how difficult a game go is and how difficult it is to win.

So I was quite surprised to win three games in a row after my bad start. I was expecting to have a much harder time of it, yet the series went so well for me . . . Perhaps without being aware of it I had come out of my slump. At the present [late December] I have won seven games in a row. It's strange how you're either all up or all down. Rather than joy at defending the title, my main feeling is one of relief.

Sonoda was not an easy opponent for me. As the Tengen tournament games in which he defeated Takemiya, Ishida, Kato, and Yamashiro show, he plays a bold, powerful game. Even so, I didn't expect him to play large moyos quite so much. He must have thought that I was weak against moyos.

Some people are saying that this title match must have been good training for facing Takemiya in the Kisei title match, but I disagree. Sonoda and Takemiya both play moyos, but there are subtle differences between them. It's hard to put it in a nutshell, but Takemiya expands his moyos from the side into the centre, whereas Sonoda builds up a big centre before you've realized what he's up to. Each has a highly individual style. I couldn't imitate them. I will have to start all over again when I face Takemiya.

Last year I started out well, but the middle of the year was rock bottom. I ended up well, so

I didn't have to start the new year in a trough. I'm confident that I can rise to the top again. If this form continues into 1987, I may be able to reach new heights.

I would like to review the fourth Tengen game in detail. In this game I overlooked a life-and-death position and this led to a crisis. Sonoda became aware of it first; I was oblivious, yet I won — it only goes to show you what a difficult game go is.

White: Kobayashi Koichi

Black: Sonoda Yuichi

Played on 16 December 1986 in Tokushima City, Shikoku.





Figure 1 (1 - 45)

Figure 1 (1 - 45). A moyo in a flash


The Sonoda style is to take up position with 5 and 7 rather than playing the sanren-sei. He doesn't answer 8 by playing a pincer at 'a' either. He defends once at 9, tenukis against White's slide to 10, then plays 13.

Black 15. Not defending here is conceivable, but I couldn't tell you what is a good alternative. White 16 is at any rate a big fuseki point.

Black 17 feels right. The moves from 19 on are a little crude, but this is a bold strategy. Black 13 is in a good position; Black gets thickness if he links the top to the bottom. I have never played such a bold strategy with black, so it's hard for me to say, but beyond question it is a powerful strategy.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

In no time at all a large moyo has materialized. It's frightening the way Black has disdained territory and staked everything on the centre. This inevitably happens when one plays Sonoda. I'm not responsible.

The invasion at 32 is essential. Pressing at 'b' also looks good, but if Black jumps to 'c' White won't be able to touch the bottom area.

White 34. If at 35, Black plays 34, White 'd', Black 'e' — the ladder is bad for White and he has no suitable ladder block.

Black 37. Trying to catch White with 1 in Dia. 1 is surely out of the question. If the white group lives, the game is over for Black.

The sequence in the figure is more or less a one-way street. White has helped Black with his moyo strategy, but burrowing inside his moyo and taking territory is the fighting approach. White has no choice.

The fight comes to a close with 44. This variation looks plausible, but you don't see it in play. Later —

Dia. 2. Black can aim at the 1-3 combination, but at this stage he doesn't profit from the result to 8. It's more unsettling for White if Black threatens to exploit the various kinds of aji — for example, Black 'a', White 8, Black 'b'.

Now that White has destroyed the bottom area, Black 45 is natural. Black's large moyo strategy begins to assume tangible form.






Figure 2 (46 - 71)



Dia. 4




Dia. 3

Figure 2 (46 - 71). Sonoda's inconsistent play

Black 47 after 45 was unexpected. Worrying about the top when Black has focussed his game on the centre is strange. In this game the centre is bigger than the top. If Black is going to be completely consistent, expanding the centre with 1 in Dia. 3 is only common sense. After the game Sonoda suggested Black 'a' instead. Either way I expected to be able to make a game of it, but it would be very difficult to work out how to erase the moyo, to judge how much of the centre one could let Black take.

White 48 is big — compare Black 'a'.

Black 49. Sonoda calls this the losing move. I was certainly grateful for the exchange for White 52. The slight amount of territory Black gains



Dia. 5

with 49 is far outweighed by the sin of erasing the various kinds of aji in the corner. Instead —

Dia. 4. If Black blocked off the centre with 1 and 3, I planned to play around 4. Black 1 may be submissive (i.e. 48 in the figure becomes a forcing move). Sonoda's theory was to play Black 'a' even now. In that case, I'd play White 'b' or 'c'.

For some reason Sonoda suddenly switched to territory with 47 and again with 49. With the addition of 52, Black can no longer develop a momentum for surrounding the centre [i.e. it would be easier for Black to take the centre if he could play centre moves exploiting bad aji in White's bottom left corner], so he probably has no choice about switching to 53. However, there is no denying that his large-moyo strategy has stumbled.

I thought that invading at 54 was natural fighting spirit, but it occurred to me later that taking up position with 1 in Dia. 5 would have been a calmer approach. I didn't want Black to

convert all the top into territory with 2, but I was being a little greedy. Competing in area with 3 to 7 would have been good enough. Trying to win this way is probably the correct approach. If Black 8 at 'a', Black wouldn't be behind in territory, but White can thrust in at 'b', so Black's territory is not free of weaknesses.

The sequence from White 54 fits the situation and is not bad. White 66 struck me as a really stylish move. If White extends at 67, the group looks shaky after Black strikes at the vital point of 66, and White doesn't have enough space to live in.

White 68. For the time being White has no problems. However, neglecting to exchange 'b' for Black 'c' was a bad slip.

When Black sets out to enclose the centre with 69, White 70 feels right. If White plays on the fourth line instead, Black makes an annoying cap.

Black 71. If Black single-mindedly tries to take the centre with 1 in Dia. 6, White solidifies territory with 2 and 4, and Black will find that his books don't balance.




Figure 3 (72 – 93). *Ignorance is bliss.*

Black 73 launches a bold sacrifice strategy. White has to be careful with 80. If he is in too much of a hurry to capture, playing 1 in Dia. 7, Black's centre suddenly swells up with 2 and 4: White loses. White would like to be able to capture with 1 in Dia. 8, but Black 4 makes miai





Figure 3 (72 – 93)




Dia. 9

of 'a' and 'b'. White 80 guards against 'b' in this diagram.

Black's aim is to sacrifice the three stones in such a way as to help him surround the centre, but the difference in territory is already decisive. However, White 88 was much too greedy. This was my last chance to take the precaution of exchanging 1 for 2 in Dia. 9. White 3 next would be big. Even if Black surrounds the centre with 4 to 12, I would have absolute confidence in White's position in this diagram. I was a little concerned about the problem of 1, but I never dreamed that Black would make a serious attempt to capture me.

Sonoda was just as oblivious of this point. This was a strange way for a game to develop. Usually the first side to wake up wins, but



Dia. 10 13: connects

that's not how it turned out, which goes to show what a mysterious game go is. Ignorance was truly bliss.

Sonoda says that the moment he played 93 he realized that there was a way to kill the white group. But the timing could not have been worse. He had to realize it before playing 93. Locally, 93 is a good tesuji.

Dia. 10. If White answers at 1, he gets squeezed up to 14. Giving Black a sente squeeze would be painful enough in itself, but worse, I would have been helpless when Black launched an attack at 'a'. Having woken up to what was going on, Sonoda was starting to get restless, but I was still blissfully ignorant.

Figure 4 (93 – 120). A rude surprise

Ironically Black 93 turned out to be the losing move. If Sonoda had woken up before playing here and made a hane at 1 in Dia. 11 with an innocent look on his face, he would have been able to avail himself of this opportunity. Secure in the belief that I was way ahead, I intended to play 2. Black could have walled off the centre with 3 and 5, then attacked at 7. I would probably have gasped in surprise. By this time there would have been no way to save the group. If you play out the endgame from this diagram, you get a win of around ten points for Black on the board. At the most, that's all. I might have woken up before playing 4 or 6, but even so it would have been a close game. I probably wouldn't have noticed.

Fortunately for me, the solid extension of 94





Figure 4 (93 – 120)



Dia. 11

provided some insurance for the group at the top. Even if Black takes the corner with 'a' after White 104, White's win is not affected.

I was startled, to put it mildly, when Black attacked at 107. I was even more surprised when Black gave me the ponnuki at 112 and kept on trying to capture me. For a moment I was crestfallen, thinking that my group had suddenly kicked the bucket. However, with the extension of 94 in place and the shape on the right side still undecided, it looked as if I could save the group. Needless to say, I was greatly relieved.

Unreasonable though it may be, Black must continue his pursuit. For Black 113, Black 116 is also a vital point, but then White lives easily with White 114, Black 115, White 113.

White 118, the 'duffer's kosumi', is a good move; if White thoughtlessly jumped to 'b', he would have only a 50-50 chance of living after Black 118, White 'c', Black 'd'.

When White runs diagonally with 120, he gets a lot of potential eye shape; I could see my way through the crisis. Apparently Sonoda had also accepted that the group would live.





Figure 4 (121 - 164)

Figure 4 (121 - 164). *A nerve-wracking game*
In the end White has a win even on the board.



Dia. 12

With 27 -

Dia. 12. Even if Black tries to capture White with 1 and 3, White counterattacks at 4. White can play 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd', White 'e' in sente, so the large black group is endangered. You can see how effectively the marked stone is working for White.

Black resigns after White 164.

Time taken. White: 4 hours 35 minutes.

Black: 5 hours 35 minutes.

('Kido', February 1987. Tengen report translated by John Power.)



The fight is over: Kobayashi defends the Tengen title in a final game with an unusual and suspenseful twist.

The World of Go

Nakayama Noriyuki

In the news section of GW46, we reported the publication in Japan of a go book in a highly respected series of intellectual paperbacks. The book was The World of Go by Nakayama Noriyuki 5-dan and the series was Iwanami Shinsho. This was the first go book to be included in the series, and the Iwanami publishing house was highly gratified by the fact that it promptly made the best seller list, going as high as number two soon after it appeared.

The secret of the book's popularity is that it describes the historical, social and cultural background of the game in a way calculated to appeal both to the player and the non-player. It is just the book to give to someone who wonders why you are so fascinated by the game.

Beginning in this issue, we would like to present some extracts from the book.



Nakayama 5-dan

Chapter Five: A White Paper on the Lives of Professionals

A tough profession

My profession, that of professional go player, is a rather unusual one. When people ask me what I do for a living and I reply "kishi" (professional go player), no one ever understands immediately.

It can't be helped, so I explain that I'm a go professional. Oh, really? What do you do then? The message just doesn't get through to them.

I'm getting fed up by this time, but I go on to explain that I play go on a professional basis. The other person then looks surprised. Really, you don't look like that sort of person — he's confused me with a professional gambler.

At present there are about 300 professional players affiliated with the Nihon Ki-in. There are about 100 at the Kansai Ki-in. That makes roughly 400. In addition, there are about 90 in Korea, 20 or so in China, and about ten or so in Taiwan, which means that all told there are not much more than 500 in the whole world. We professionals are a race of people living in a very special world — we're about as rare on the ground as pandas, you could say.

To get an idea of just how few 400 is, there are 200,000 doctors in Japan. Comparing us with

lawyers, who are considered to be one of the minority professions in Japan but who actually number 12,000, puts us into perspective. A closer comparison would be with the traditional profession of sumo wrestler.

Kasugano, the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Sumo Association, serialized his autobiography *This Path* in the Tokyo Newspaper and in it he made the following interesting comparison with go.

In the sumo world, those in the juryo and makunouchi divisions are called sekitori. They are considered fullfledged wrestlers. Their treatment is completely different from that of wrestlers in the junior divisions. In fields with similar professional rankings, you find that only players 4-dan and up in shogi and 1-dan and up in go are called professionals, but if you consider the smaller numbers and the divisions of status, sumo is so much severer that there is no comparison. (6 January 1986)

Since wrestlers in the junior divisions are not recognized as professionals, I can agree that sumo is severer. However, the active career

of a wrestler lasts at most for 15 or 20 years; at the other extreme, there are wrestlers who lose their professional standing after one tournament. Moreover, in the six tournaments held each year there is a rapid succession of new wrestlers making their debut and fading wrestlers bowing out. I don't know about status, but when you compare their number to go players, who continue in active competition until they die, there is probably little difference in the total number over the long run.

As it happens, the go world also has its divisions of status. In go, if you pass the examination for professional shodan (actually a tournament), you become, as Kasugano puts it, a fullfledged professional. Even if you are the lowest rank of shodan (1-dan), you can, if you keep on winning, play on equal terms with 9-dan players and even with the Meijin. To give an example, Komatsu Hideko 2-dan, when she was Ninomiya Hideko 1-dan, won a game on even taking white against Chino Tadahiko 9-dan. In sumo terms, a shodan would be a wrestler in one of the junior divisions, yet she defeated a player who had played in the Honinbo league, the equivalent of a senior wrestler in the top sumo division. This shows that in go the disparity in strength is not so great. Moreover, in go you can't pull off an upset with a surprise attack in the initial charge; Ninomiya earned her victory after slugging it out round after round during a protracted ten-hour contest.

The Nihon Ki-in's match fees are paid according to rank and are minutely subdivided. For example, if we look at the Asahi newspaper's Meijin tournament, we see that the players get a match fee for each game they play, plus the right to earn another match fee if they win. The fees schedule in March 1986 was as follows:

1st Preliminary Round (for 1- to 4-dans)

1-dan: ¥48,000	3-dan: ¥59,000
2-dan: ¥53,000	4-dan: ¥64,000

(\$1 = ¥145)

The six players who survive the knockout rounds win their way into the next preliminary, where they receive the game fees for a 5-dan.

2nd Preliminary Round

5-dan: ¥127,000	8-dan: ¥171,000
6-dan: ¥138,000	9-dan: ¥204,000

7-dan: ¥160,000

About 30 players win their way through to the next round.

3rd Preliminary Round

All participants: ¥303,000 per game.

Playoff: ¥380,000. The winners of the three playoffs gain places in the Meijin league.

Meijin League (nine members, all-play-all)

¥670,000 per game to the winner, ¥500,000 to the loser.

The winner of the league earns the right to challenge the Meijin in the title match, for which he is paid a match fee of ¥4,200,000. If he wins the title, he takes the first prize of ¥20,000,000. Of course, only one person a year accomplishes this.

Well, I've just revealed some of the financial secrets of us professionals, but what I would most like to draw your attention to in the above chart is the wide gap between 4- and 5-dan. As you can see, the fee paid almost doubles. As far as treatment goes, there is a big difference in their status.

In short, you could say, to put it in Kasugano's terms, that players from 1- to 4-dan are junior wrestlers and that you only become a fullfledged professional when you reach 5-dan. For someone 4-dan or lower to play players 5-dan and up, he first has to fight his way through the first preliminary round. But even this section is swarming with young future champions, so that is easier said than done. Ninomiya 1-dan, mentioned above, broke through this barrier and so got the chance to play Chino.

So you can see why the first target of a new professional is to make 5-dan. If you get there in four or five years, you're a candidate for a future Meijin. Even if you take six or seven years, you are still quite promising. In the go world there is an old custom according to which players 5-dan and up are called the 'high-dan players' to distinguish them from the 'low-dan players' 4-dan and below. It might be appropriate to compare this division with Kasugano's distinction between junior and senior wrestlers.

Some readers may feel that making a big distinction between 4-dans and 5-dans is absurd

when there is virtually no difference in strength. It's discrimination against 4-dans, it's unfair, it's a non-tariff barrier — there are all kinds of criticisms you might expect. But in the go world you don't hear a single voice raised in complaint.

If you don't like it, get promoted — this is the simple rejoinder. So when you ask a professional what were the happiest days of his life, the first answer, without fail, is when he became shodan, and the second when he reached 5-dan. However, there are many players who never see this second happy day even after 60 years trying. The world of go is just as severe as the world of sumo.

A professional can't make a living from tournament fees.

At present there are seven open tournaments a year for professional players, including the Meijin tournament described above. Each is sponsored by a newspaper.

Ranked in order of prestige, the current tournaments are as follows. The sum given for each is the contract fee the newspaper pays the Nihon Ki-in (as of March 1986).

12th Kisei (Yomiuri): ¥258,000,000 (nearly \$1.8 million)

12th Meijin (Asahi): ¥196,000,000

42nd Honinbo (Mainichi): ¥167,000,000

25th Judan (Sankei): ¥72,800,000

11th Tengen (Three Newspapers Association): ¥72,800,000

34th Oza (Nihon Keizai): ¥62,120,000

11th Gosei (Association of Regional Newspapers): ¥48,600,000.

There are a number of other tournaments, such as the Shinjin-O (king of the new stars), the Women's Honinbo, TV tournaments, and so on, but there are various limitations on participation.

As you can see from the above table, the Kisei, Meijin, and Honinbo tournaments have generous fees and are known as the 'big three'. The amounts given for the Kisei, Tengen, and Gosei tournaments include the contract fees for the Kansai Ki-in, so apparently the gap between the Kisei and the Meijin has almost vanished.

One way of putting it is to say that every year 400 professionals are buying tickets in seven lotteries. If you are lucky enough to pick the

first prize, you gain wealth and renown. A player like me, who has no hope of winning first prize, at least can dream of winning 5th prize (breaking through into the 3rd preliminary round).

Next, let's look at the tournament winnings of the top ten players of 1985.

Top Prize Money Winners of 1985

1. Kobayashi Koichi, Meijin, Judan, Tengen: ¥61,900,000

2. Cho Chikun, Kisei: ¥58,930,000

3. Takemiya Masaki, Honinbo: ¥39,810,000

4. Kato Masao, Oza: ¥25,970,000

5. Rin Kaiho, 9-dan: ¥24,190,000

6. Otake Hideo, Gosei: ¥18,380,000

7. Yamashiro Hiroshi 9-dan: ¥13,630,000

8. Kusunoki Teruko, Women's Honinbo: ¥9,600,000

9. Kataoka Satoshi 8-dan: ¥8,930,000

10. Hane Yasumasa 9-dan: ¥8,720,000

Cho Chikun, who only a couple of years earlier had monopolized the top four titles of Kisei, Meijin, Honinbo, and Judan, has slipped a little and handed over the top place to Kobayashi. This list makes it clear that the top places are taken by the title-holders and the participants in the Meijin and Honinbo leagues. This is a world in which current strength is the only thing that counts, so we no longer see such great players as Sakata Eio and Fujisawa Shuko in the list.

Top Prize Money Winners in Japanese Women's Golf in 1985

1. T'u A-yu (Taiwan): ¥65,630,000

2. Osako Tatsuko: ¥52,440,000

3. Gu Gyokuhi (Korea): ¥34,000,000

4. Higuchi Hisako: ¥30,570,000

5. Wu Ming-yueh (Taiwan): ¥29,860,000

6. Imahori Ritsu: ¥29,010,000

7. Yoshikawa Nayoko: ¥28,180,000

8. Huang Pi-hsun (Taiwan): ¥27,940,000

9. Moriguchi Yuko: ¥24,560,000

10. Huang (Taiwan): ¥24,100,000

For the purposes of comparison, I have listed above the top ten money-winners on the professional women golfers' circuit. This listing is quite a good match for the go listing. In the nature of things, one would prefer to give the

men's golf rankings, but what with the top male golfer Nakajima Tsuneyuki having broken through the ¥100,000,000 barrier, go players can't hope to compete. That means that we have to compete with the women, and if you look at the top three, the Meijin, Kisei, and Honinbo, it is actually quite close. However, when you go lower down the list, you find that it is no contest. If we extended the listing down to the 20th or 30th place, the disparity would only become greater, so we will spare our readers the painful sight.

The conclusion is that in the go world only about ten or so players can make a living from tournament fees alone. This is what happens to geniuses who from the age of nine or ten, or like Kobayashi Satoru from the age of three, have set their hearts on becoming professionals and completely devoted themselves to study. What on earth is the reason for this?

Reluctant though I am to say this, the fact has to be faced that the prize money and game fees are too small. This is not acceptable treatment for the standard-bearers of a cultural tradition of which Japan can be proud before the world. This is a problem that also affects morale, so something should be done about it, not just by the Nihon Ki-in, but by everyone connected with go and by people in the political and financial worlds.

If, as I say, only about ten players can make a living from tournament prize money, what about the large number of other professionals? Players like myself, who am around 200th in the rankings, become 'lesson professionals', that is, we earn our living by teaching amateurs. Perhaps 10% of players are tournament professionals and the other 90% teaching professionals.

A player around 30 in the rankings would make about 50% of his income from tournament fees and 50% from teaching. The really strange thing is that there is not much difference in income between a top-flight professional 10th in the rankings and a third-rate professional who is ranked 100th or a fifth-rate one ranked 200th. In a world in which ability is supposed to matter most, one can only conclude that something is badly wrong. This is not the way it should be.


It always seems to me that there is no problem with the way things are for the 200th player, but

the great players who make the top ten should at least be as well rewarded as T'u A-yu. And for the top players, the monarchs of Japanese go culture, there should be no limit to the rewards. This would give hope to all 400 professional go players, increase the number of professional aspirants, and in its turn probably lead to raising the level of Japanese go.


One further thought occurs to me. Is it acceptable for go to lag behind golf and baseball and tennis and soccer, behind musicians, painters, calligraphers, the Sumo Association, the Central Racing Association, the singer Misora Hibari, the baseball player Nagashima Shigeo, and the various other professional fields? I've never heard of a profession with a history and a tradition in which less than ten people can make a proper living. Of course, there is no need for us to become giant corporations like the heads of the flower-arrangement and dancing and tea-ceremony schools . . .

(Translated by John Power)

Find the Best Move: Two Problems



1. What is the best move for Black?



2. What is the best way for Black to attack White's corner?


Answers on page 43.

Three Trick Moves

Abe Yoshiteru 8-dan


This is the final instalment in this series. To end with a bang, Abe presents three difficult trick variations of the taisha ('large slant')

joseki, which is notorious for its complications. The taisha move is 1 in Problem 1.




Problem 1. Black to play

The moves to 12 are the standard pattern. How should Black answer when White attacks at 13 instead of playing the usual move of 'a'?



Problem 2. Black to play

This time White tries to trick Black with the 1-3 combination. Black wants to push through the gap at 'a', but he has to be careful.



Problem 3. Black to play

White can also attack from a distance with 1, but actually his aim is the same as in Problem 2. How should Black frustrate his plans?


Answers on page 44.

Bad Moves: How Many Points Do They Lose?

Ishida Yoshio


In this series, Ishida Yoshio runs some typical amateur mistakes through his computer and comes up with numerical values for them. When

you know how much a habitual mistake is costing you, it may be easier to avoid making it.



Mistake 12


Black 2 is a good, solid move, but 4 and 6 are overdoing it — they are too negative. How many points do they cost Black?



Mistake 13

Black 1 and 3 are very bad moves strategically. How many points does Black lose by playing this way?

Answers on page 45.




Mistake 14

Black 2 makes a notorious bad shape, called 'tokkuri' because of its supposed resemblance to a sake bottle. How much does Black lose by making this shape?

Good Style and Correct Shape


Rin Kaiho

In this series Rin Kaiho analyses the elements that make up good style and correct shape in a number of basic patterns. The theme of the series is how to use this knowledge to attack and defend correctly. The aim is not to give you sequences to memorize but to help you develop your feel for the game so that you will be able to find the correct move instinctively.



Problem 11: Black to play

When White wants to build thickness on the right side, he may press at 1, giving up the aji of invading at 'a'. In answering, Black should avoid as far as possible helping White to make thickness.



Problem 12: White to play

White has a thin, weak shape. What is the vital point for reinforcing his position?

Answers on page 48.


Find the Best Move: Answers

Continued from page 41.


Answer to Problem 1

Dia. 1. Black 1 is unreasonable. White cuts and after 6 playing on the left and right are miai for him. Black is in trouble.

Dia. 2. Black 1 forces White 2, so Black can extend to 3, but this leaves Black with a weak point at 'a'. Black 1 is inefficient.



Dia. 1




Dia. 2


Dia. 3. Black 1 is best. White must play 2 to prevent Black 'a', so now Black extends to 3 with no weak points left behind. If Black plays 1 at 'b' or 'c', White can aim at 'd'.

Answer to Problem 2


Dia. 1. Black 1 is crude; the cut at 3 fails. Black 1 at 'a' or 'b' also lacks forcefulness.




Dia. 3



Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

Dia. 2. Black 1 is an exquisite tesuji. If White 2, Black cuts off two stones with 3 and 5. If White 4 at 5, Black plays 'a'.

Dia. 3. White 2 offers more resistance, but Black is content to solidify his side position by playing 3 in sente. After 4, Black can aim at the aji of 'a'.


Three Trick Moves: Answers

Continued from page 42.


Answer to Problem 1

Dia. 1. Black 1 is the only move, but if Black keeps pushing down at 3 in answer to 2, he falls into the trap. After White 10 –


Dia. 2. Black loses the semeai after 16. If Black 11 at 14, White's cut at 12 is a tesuji; if then Black 16, White 'a', and Black collapses.




Dia. 1: wrong



Dia. 2: trapped



Dia. 3: correct




Dia. 4: good for Black


Dia. 3. Backtracking with 3 is essential: this is the key point of this variation. Next –

Dia. 4. White has little choice but to play 1, whereupon Black builds thickness with 2 and looks forward to attacking the white group in the centre. This is a favourable result for Black. If White plays 3 at 'a', Black 'b' becomes the vital point.

Dia. 5. If you are going to play 1, you have to know how to counter White's blockade at 2. Playing simply with 3 etc. is good enough. Black can be satisfied with this result. Note the effectiveness of Black 7.



Dia. 5: good enough




Dia. 1: wrong


Answer to Problem 2

Dia. 1. White wants Black to go all out and attempt to catch him. After 9 –

Dia. 2. White squeezes with 10 etc., then uses the kosumi tesuji of 18 to win the semeai. The problem now is to work out where Black went wrong.




*Dia. 2: captured
13: connects*




Dia. 3: correct

Dia. 3. Black 1 to 5 are obviously reasonable moves. The key, as before, is to drop back at the right time, which is with 7. Black retreats just in time to stop White from squeezing. Next –

Dia. 4. The continuation is simple. White must capture with 1, so Black builds centre thickness with 2 to 6. If White tries to save his three stones, every move he plays will help Black to strengthen his position.



Dia. 4: good for Black




Dia. 5: good for Black

Dia. 5. If White captures on the other side with 1, Black can force with 2, then jump out to 4. Black is left with a big move at 'a'; Black 'b' next would be sente.


Answer to Problem 3

Dia. 1. Black 1 to 5 are natural, but venturing further in is taboo. If Black 7, White initiates a squeeze with 8. Next –


Dia. 2. Black 17 offers the strongest resistance, but the resulting ko is not a pleasant one for Black. It is White's turn to take the ko and Black has no adjacent ko threats. White will also have time to connect at 15 if Black does retake




Dia. 1: tricked



*Dia. 2: a bad ko
13: connects*



Dia. 3: correct




Dia. 4: continuation

the ko.

Dia. 3. The theme is the same: Black must pick the right time to pull back. The point of these three trick moves is that Black must resist the temptation to try to destroy White. Black 7 to 11 give Black a satisfactory result.

Dia. 4. The marked black stone is a big move, as it sets up the sente continuation of 1 and 3.

Dia. 5. White 1 eliminates the bad corner aji, but then Black 2 and 4 are sente, so Black gets greater centre thickness. This would be a very




*Dia. 5: bad for White
painful result for White.*

(*'Let's Go'*, December 1984)

Bad Moves: How Many Points Do They Lose?

Answers




Pattern 12: Black 4 and 6 lose 5 points.


Black probably thinks that he is playing perfectly ordinary moves, yet without his knowing it his position is deteriorating. Black 2 can't be criticized, but 4 and 6 are very slack. Black may have succeeded in enclosing the top area, but since his moves have no effect whatsoever on White, they are small.

Dia. 1 shows the correct way to play. Black 4 must be a high move; Black 6 must be the solid move here. Now compare this result to Pattern 12. Not only does Black have about five points more than there, his solid move at 6 gives him power in the centre.

I assessed the loss in Pattern 12 at five points, just taking into account the difference in territory, but to be more precise the loss is probably



Dia. 1




Dia. 2

greater. On the other hand, the conservative moves of 4 and 6 in Pattern 12 do make it difficult for White to get up to any mischief inside Black's position, so let's leave the assessment at five points.

Next, the two 3-3 invasions at 'a' and 'b' in


Dia. 1 will be important points.

Dia. 2. When Black has set out to enclose the top area (this is all the more true in Pattern 12), he will be tempted to answer White 1 by securing his territory with 2 to 6. He keeps sente, so he can now defend the other corner with 8. This is of course not bad for Black, but one is struck by his narrow vision: all he is thinking of is territory. Instead of 4 —




Dia. 3

Dia. 3. I recommend the more positive strategy of blocking at 1. Black loses territory when White runs at 4, but since all his marked stones are linked up he need not worry about this. He hanes at 5 and prepares to attack the marked white stones. White will find this thick style of playing more disagreeable than Dia. 2.



Dia. 4


Dia. 4. Another powerful strategy is to hane at 4. This approach is recommended in some joseki books, but one can't really say whether it is better than Dia. 1. Black gains with 4 and 6, but his position at the top right is correspond-



Dia. 5


ingly thinner.

Dia. 5. It is difficult to know how to answer White 1. Black would probably want to make the best use of the marked stones by surrounding territory with 4 and 6. There is nothing wrong with this, but I would be more upset to have Black follow Dia. 3. It comes down to a question of individual preference.




Pattern 13: Black 1 and 3 lose 5 points.

Black's play here is much worse than in Pattern 12, even though we have given the same estimate for the damage. Black 1 and 3 are bad style: they help the opponent more than one's own side.



Dia. 1


Dia. 1. Continuing with 1 and 3 makes the result even worse. Black would have a far better position if he had not played any moves at all. Using 1 to push up at 2 would also be terribly bad style.




Dia. 2

Dia. 2. Pressing at 1 is the right approach if Black wants to do anything here. White will probably run along the top with 2; if there are no urgent moves elsewhere, Black could make thickness by connecting at 'a'. In contrast to 1 in Pattern 13, which helps White move out, Black seals White in with one move.

Dia. 3. If White makes the mistake of trying



Dia. 3




Dia. 4

to break through with 2 and 4, his group collapses after 7.

Dia. 4. An alternative strategy is to attach at 1. If White 2, Black 3 makes the whole group vulnerable. If White 'a', Black plays 'b'; if White 'c', Black extends at 'a' — either move is troublesome for White to deal with.

Black can choose between Dias. 2 and 4 in the light of the overall position. If he wants to emphasize the centre, he follows Dia. 2; if he wants to take territory and attack White, he goes for Dia. 4. Pattern 13 fails to achieve either of these objectives.


There is another variation which is playable, though inferior to Dias. 2 and 4. This is Black 1 in Dia. 5. This has the drawback of letting White move out with 2, but when Black plays 5 the white group does not have definite eye shape. If Black were to play 3 at 'a', obviously a ridiculous move, we would get the same result as Pattern 13, which shows how bad it is.



Dia. 5

Pattern 14: Black loses 0 points.


Black 2 has traditionally been regarded as bad shape, but no one has convincingly demonstrated that it is a bad move, let alone why. Actually you can't prove that it is a bad move, so that means




Pattern 14

that it doesn't lose any points. Black 2 moves out into the centre, so how could it be bad? I have long maintained that 2 is not a bad move. Next —

Dia. 1. If White 1, it is important for Black to poke his head out with 2. If he neglects to play here, White will seal him in by playing at 2 himself.




Dia. 1



Dia. 2


Dia. 2. When White attacks at 1, Black 2 is always given as the correct answer. If then White 3 or 'a', Black must come back and reinforce at 4.

If one compares Dias. 1 and 2, one finds that in both cases Black has invested two moves (the marked stone and 2 in Dia. 1) to move out into the centre. The differences between these moves are subtle. Black makes excellent thickness with 4 in Dia. 2, but the speed with which Black moves out with 2 in Dia. 1 is by no means inferior to Dia. 2. Black's position in Dia. 2 is perhaps slightly superior, but the difference is microscopic. It's not a difference that you need worry about.



Dia. 3


Dia. 3. The Black 2-4 combination is a solid strategy. If White 7, Black attacks from the direction of 'a'; if White uses 7 to extend to 'b', Black can make a severe attack at 'c' or 'd'. One cannot say absolutely whether this is better or worse than the strategies in Dias. 1 and 2.



Dia. 4

Dia. 4. I said that the kosumi at 2 in Dia. 1 was important, but the bold strategy of attaching at 1 is not out of the question. One dislikes giving White the good move of 2, but the idea is to recoup this loss by attacking at 3. If one assumes that 'a' is sente, forcing White 'b', and

that pushing down even further will also be sente, Black can launch quite a severe attack. However, this is a variation for players who have confidence in their fighting strength. It might be better not to imitate it.



Dia. 5

After Dia. 1 —

Dia. 5. White will probably reinforce his position with 1. There is no need for Black to answer at the top, so he can attack White with a pincer at 2 or 'a'. In a four- or five-stone handicap game with a black stone on the bottom right star-point, this attack would be very severe. If Black later gets the chance to switch to 'b', he can be very satisfied. If you played like this, you would soon have the player with white squirming. It should be apparent that there are no drawbacks to following Pattern 14.

The lesson is not to take anything on trust. Just because the books say that a certain move is bad shape or a bad move, you don't have to believe them. Conventional wisdom has its shortcomings too. The test is: does a move work?


(*'Let's Go'*, May 1985)

Good Style and Correct Shape: Answers


Continued from page 43.

Answer to Problem 11

Dia. 1. When White presses at 1, forgoing the invasion at 'a', his aim must be to build up



Dia. 1




Dia. 2


thickness that will combine with a position on the right side. Black's problem is to keep this thickness to a minimum.

Dia. 2. Black strives to take as much territory as he can with 1, but this has the drawback of letting White play 2 in sente. If Black omits 3, White 'a' will be very troublesome. The result here is that Black has let White play two forcing moves, increasing his centre thickness. Black 1 shows that Black is only thinking of his own position, with no regard for what the opponent is doing.

Dia. 3. Black 1 suffers from the same defect. When White plays 2, Black will get a thin shape



Dia. 3




Dia. 4: correct


if he doesn't defend at 3. Once again White builds his thickness in sente.

Dia. 4. Though it may seem low, dodging to 1 is the correct answer. This avoids giving White any further forcing moves. If later White plays 'a', Black can connect at 'b', as White 'a' is not really much of a forcing move. For that matter, connecting at 'b' is not essential.

Dia. 5. If instead White tried the forcing moves of 1 and 3, Black should dodge to 4, following the same principle of not giving White more forcing moves than he has to. Instead of 4 —




Dia. 5




Dia. 6

Dia. 6. If Black is greedy, he can take more territory with 1 and 3, but then 2 and 4 work perfectly to secure the centre thickness White wants.

Dia. 7. If White continues after 1 with 2, Black can counter with 3. White 'a' is simply answered with Black 'b'.



Dia. 7




Dia. 1

Answer to Problem 12


Dia. 1. It's obvious at a glance that the white group is very vulnerable to attack. One move is hardly going to transform it into a strong group, but the right reinforcement will prevent White from pushing Black around too much.

The problem is not just that White's shape is



Dia. 2

4: connects




Dia. 3


thin; it has a fatal weakness. Discovering this weakness is the clue to finding the right reinforcement.

Dia. 2. If White does nothing, Black will exploit his shortage of liberties by throwing in at 1. With 3 and 5 he forces White into terrible shape. After 6, he might be able to capture White with Black 'a'.

Dia. 3. The vital point for defence is White 1. This move may seem slow and uninspired, but in view of the special circumstances — White's extreme shortage of liberties — it is the only move. If you visualize the exchange of Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c', it should be obvious that 1 is the vital point.



Dia. 4




Dia. 5

Dia. 4. The bamboo joint of 1 is often a vital point and it is true that it prevents the squeeze, but running one's head into a solid black position like this makes bad shape. If Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c' follow, you can see that White has a heavy, cumbersome shape. In contrast, White 1 in Dia. 3 is moving out into the wide open spaces.

Dia. 5. In this variation of the taisha joseki, Black 1, though it looks slow, is the only move for pulling out the four black stones. White will play 2, so Black can force with 3 before playing the hane at 5.

Dia. 6. Some players may be tempted to hane immediately at 1, but after the 2-3 exchange White 4 takes advantage of Black's shortage of liberties. Black will be forced to connect at



Dia. 6

Dia. 7

Dia. 8

'a', making painfully bad shape. This only serves to confirm that 4 is the vital point.

Dia. 7. White 1 here looks very slack, but it is an excellent move, one that Otake played

in a game.

Dia. 8. White could instead play 1, but then Black 2 will be sente. White played the patient move of 1 in Dia. 7 because he disliked the prospect of 2 here. If White omits 3, Black will play at 3 and capture three stones.

('Kido', June 1986. This is the last instalment by Rin. Part 2 of the series, by Cho Chikun, begins in our next issue.)

Abe Makes 9-dan

After twelve long years as an 8-dan, Abe Yoshiteru has finally made it to the top of the promotion ladder. Success came in his 99th oteai (rating tournament) game as an 8-dan. Since he had blown two earlier chances, he was probably beginning to think that he was not destined to reach the top, despite the fact that he is one of the most studious professionals around.

Abe earned the necessary points for promotion in a game with Shirae Haruhiko 7-dan and he had to overcome some adventurous play by his opponent. Shirae dislikes playing the same tired old fuseki patterns game after game and in particular he dislikes grubbing about for points in the opening. Playing the opening moves on the 6th line has been a favourite strategy of his for a number of years.

White: Abe Yoshiteru 8-dan

Black: Shirae Haruhiko 7-dan (playing on the handicap of taking black in two games out of three). No komi. Played on 6 November 1986.

Figure 1 (1 – 50). The variation with 20 at 'a' would be more interesting. White 22 should be the extension at 'b'. When Black makes the all-out move at 47, expanding his moyo while attacking at the top, he goes into the lead. The Apollo-style strategy of 1 is achieving success.

Figure 2 (51 – 98). Black has done well on the left side, but he goes wrong on the right. Black 55 is slack: he should first jump to 59. This time White goes all out in taking territory with 60 to 88. By 98 he is a little ahead.

Moves after 98 omitted. Black resigns.




Figure 1 (1 – 50)





Figure 2 (51 – 98)

Tesuji Magic


Yamabe Toshiro 9-dan

The solution to a tesuji problem often involves a startling leap of the imagination. See if you can put your imagination to work on the following problems, brought to you by the tesuji magician Yamabe. If you can solve these problems, your opponents will have good cause to fear you.




1. Black to play

Capturing just one white stone is not of much use, but capturing three will stabilize all of Black's stones. How should Black go about achieving this?




2. Black to play

It's obvious at a glance that the theme of this problem is to exploit White's shortage of liberties. The best way to do this may not be so obvious.




3. White to play

Timing is everything in this problem. White must take care not to give Black a ko.



4. Black to play

There are two ways Black can save his 11 stones: by capturing three white stones or by getting a seki.



5. Black to play

Black can make a cut, but if he doesn't time it right he won't be able to save his cut-off stones.

Answers on page 55.

Yamabe v. Go Seigen

The problems on the previous page are the final instalment in the Yamabe series, so before looking at the answers it might be appropriate to round off the series by showing some Yamabe tesuji magic in action. The game below is probably remembered by Yamabe as one of the masterpieces of his career since he managed to beat Go Seigen in his prime.

This game was played just after Go Seigen had defeated Fujisawa Hosai, then the only other 9-dan, in their second jubango (ten-game match). There were no suitable opponents to play Go on even, so the Yomiuri organized a series entitled 'First Encounters with New Stars', in which Go took on three young 6-dans whom he had not previously played. The 6-dans played on the handicap for a 3-dan difference of black-2 stones-black. The three drew lots and the result was that Yamabe got to play the first game on black. Nakamura Yutaro played the second on two stones (he won by 1 point), and Magari Reiki played the third on black (he resigned).

White: Go Seigen 9-dan

Black: Yamabe Toshiro 6-dan (aged 26)

Played on 12 & 26 April 1953.

No komi. Ten hours each.

Figure 1 (1 – 44).

Fighting starts when Black cuts at 23. Answering 22 peacefully with 'a' would also be good, but perhaps Yamabe felt that it would be







Figure 1 (1 – 44)




Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

10: connects

too passive.

Black 27 is aggressive, but Black has read out his counters to White 'b' and White 'c'. Neither move works well here, so White compromises with 28. If White plays at 1 in Dia. 1, Black could go for an exchange (furikawari) with 2 to 10, but this sequence is rather crude. White gets an excellent atari at 'a' and he can attack the corner stone with 'b'. Instead of 6 –

Dia. 2. Yamabe intended to connect at 6 here. This would force White to move out at 7, as giving up the two stones would be more costly than in Dia. 1. The problem is what happens next. Black will push up at 8, making the continuation to 17 one possibility. Black's thickness makes this a terrible result for White. Black 'a' is also a threat. Therefore –

Dia. 3. White might pull out his three stones with 15, leading to an exchange of ponnukis, but Black is more than satisfied with his corner profit, not to mention getting sente.

Black 35. Securing the corner with Black 44 would also be an excellent move. White would then press at 35, but the two black stones would still have a lot of aji. Because of 35 White is able to create trouble in the corner.

Black 43. The corner group is alive. Even if White gets a stone at 'a' in Dia. 4, then strikes at the vital point of 1, Black lives with 2 etc. The black eye is too big to be reduced to a dead nakade shape.




Figure 2 (45 - 75)

Figure 2 (45 - 75)

Black 45. The only move: Black 'a', permitting White 45, would be bad.

Black 47. If at 48, White will play a furi-kawari with White 'a', Black 49, White 47. The ponnuki would be profitable, but Black is basing his strategy here on keeping the white group eyeless.


White 50. If White yields to the temptation to atari at 1 in Dia. 5, Black has a clever answer at 2; if White 3, Black squeezes with 4 to 8, then captures the other group with 10. White therefore has no choice about 50 and 52, but then Black uses his clever follow-up at 53 to set up the squeeze with 57 etc. The sacrifices of 57 and 61 give Black an immeasurably superior squeeze to the one from playing 57 at 58 (after White 57, Black 60 would not be sente). The sequence to 66 is forced.

White 66. Attempting to counterattack with 1 in Dia. 6 would lead to disaster.


Black is happy with the result to 75.

Figure 3 (76 - 106)

Black 81 is too tight. Black should have countered White's thickness by extending to 'a'. White is unlikely to make a heavy group by



Dia. 5



Dia. 6




Figure 3 (76 - 106)

escaping with 'b' or 'c', so 81 is unnecessary. If Black really wants to play at the bottom, a large-scale move like 'd' is more interesting, but no other move has the priority of 'a' at the top.

Black 83. White has caught up, so Black has to attack the group below to make up for giving White territory at the top.

White 90 sets up at good continuation at 92. White 91 instead would be more solid, but Black would ignore it to play 'e' on the side. The drawback of 90 is that Black can attack at 91, leading to some very difficult fighting in the centre.

White 102. White's aim is to create defects in Black's shape. If he simply connected at 104, Black would connect solidly with Black 102.

White 106. White goes all out — capturing a stone with White 'f', Black 'g', White 'h' would let Black take a firm grip on the right side with Black 106. White has to stake his own claim to the side to make a game of it.






Figure 4 (107 - 152)



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

Figure 4 (107 - 152)

Black 7, 9. A tesuji to make shape — if Black just extends at 10, White plays White 9, Black 8, White 'a'.

Black 13. Going for territory with 'b' is not severe enough. White will be happy to extend to 27 and make territory himself.

Black 21. Black saves this stone because he wants to squeeze White later on.

Black 33 defends against a cut at 'c'.

White 34 makes the game quite close, so Yamabe decides that the time has come for the

final showdown. He strikes at 37, threatening White's only remaining weak group. Go Seigen of course was aware that this group was vulnerable, but he had to play 34 to make a game of it.


White 38 is the only move that saves the group. If Black cuts at 1 in Dia. 7, White counters with 2 to 8. If Black 'a', then White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd', and Black has accomplished little.

Black 39 is crude but effective. If instead Black 1 in Dia. 8, White counters with 2 and 4, and Black's attack turns out to be a dud. Black 1 at 'a' is also refuted by White 2.

White 42. If at 43, Black cuts at 42 and captures the group.

White is able to save the group but at the cost of letting Black break into his top area. This decides the game.

White 52. If omitted, Black cuts at 1 and 3 in Dia. 9. If White resists with 4, Black counters with 5 to 9. It looks as if White can capture Black with 10 to 14, but then he has no answer to Black 15. If White 'a', Black 'b' is a double threat.



Dia. 9




Figure 5 (153 - 200)




Figure 6 (201 – 264)
White connects the ko.



Figure 5 (153 – 200), Figure 6 (201 – 264)
Black wins by 2 points.


This was a complicated game but also a very entertaining one, thanks to the stream of sparkling tesujis played by Yamabe, especially in Figure 2. He deserves his reputation as the tesuji magician. To develop our own tesuji repertoire, let's look at the answers to the problems on page 51.

Tesuji Magic: Answers


Continued from page 51

Answer to Problem 1

Dia. 1. Cutting at 1 just helps White to escape with 2. Pressing at 'a' after 4 has no chance of success: White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd' and White can't be caught.




Dia. 1: failure



Dia. 2: failure

Dia. 2. Pressing at 3 looks like a tesuji, but in this case it fails. The reader can confirm for himself that pushing down between 2 and 4 does not work.

Dia. 3. The large-scale pressing move (kake) at 1 is the tesuji.




Answer to Problem 2


Dia. 1. Black 1 looks like the vital point, but plunging in here immediately does not work. When White blocks at 2, Black cannot stop him from living. If Black attaches at 5, White simply captures at 6 and lives.

Dia. 2. Black 1 also fails when White blocks at 2. If 3, White 4 ensures enough space for two eyes.


Dia. 3. The 2-1 point is often the vital point for killing a group, but here it just makes it easy for White to live. Black 'a' next is easily refuted.




Dia. 2: wrong



Dia. 3: helping White



Dia. 4: wrong for White




Dia. 5: the right timing

Dia. 4. Black 1 only works when White answers at 2. Black can then kill him with 3 and 5, but White will not be so gullible.


Dia. 5. Timing is the key: Black 5 in Dia. 1 was too late, but if Black starts out by attaching at 1, it's a different story. White must block at 2, so now Black 3 exploits his shortage of liberties. White can only play 4, but then he dies after 5 as he cannot intercept to the left of 3. Instead of 4 —

Dia. 6. If White 2, he can't connect after Black 3.


Dia. 7. If instead White 2 here, it's a similar story: White is helpless after 3 because of his lack of liberties. This problem demonstrates the importance of timing. It also shows that you shouldn't take a so-called 'vital point' on trust.




Dia. 6: dead



Dia. 7: dead



Dia. 1: failure




Dia. 2 8:ko

Answer to Problem 3


Dia. 1. Obviously the first move to look at is White 1. Black 2 is the strongest answer. If next White 3, Black 4 sets up a ko. That means that White 1 is wrong. Instead of 4 —

Dia. 2. A ko follows even if Black plays 2. If White 3, Black 4, and White cannot avoid a ko.

Dia. 3. White 1 lets Black link up with 2. If White then cuts at 3, Black has the clever counter of 4. Once again the best White can do is to get a ko.




Dia. 3: failure




Dia. 4: wrong for Black

Dia. 4. When White cut at 1 (3 in Dia. 3), he was hoping for Black 2. This way he wins the semeai (capturing race), as Black can't atari.

Dia. 5. The failures shown in Dias. 1 to 3 all arise from the bad timing of the cut. White must cut immediately. Black must answer at 2, so then White can continue by descending at 3. This is perfect timing. If Black 4, White wins the semeai with 5 and 7.



Dia. 5: correct timing




Dia. 6: worse for Black

Dia. 6. Black does not have time to link up with 2, as White makes two eyes with 3 and 5.

Dia. 7. White 3 is the wrong follow-up: it lets Black get a ko. Instead of 5 —


Dia. 8. Descending at 1 is even worse: White now loses the semeai outright.




Dia. 7: 3 is wrong Dia. 8: worst for White

Answer to Problem 4

Dia. 1. Black 1 aims at the double atari of 3, but White will surprise him by giving up the stones to the left. After 5, White makes two eyes by playing inside.




Dia. 1: White lives




Dia. 2: complete failure

Dia. 2. The cut at 1 is even less effective: it lets White save all his stones, so the black group perishes.

Dia. 3. It may not be an easy move to find, but the atari of 1 is the only way for Black to cope with the crisis.




Dia. 3: the tesuji



Dia. 4: success

Dia. 4. If White connects at 2, Black cuts at 3. This is atari, so White has no choice but to capture at 4, giving Black the time he needs to play at 5 and live. (White will next capture 1 and live also.)




Dia. 5: seki


Dia. 5. If White captures at 2 instead, Black ataris at 3. White must play 4 and 6, letting Black capture four stones, so a seki follows. Black saves his 11 stones, so he is satisfied.

Answer to Problem 5

Dia. 1. Cutting prematurely at 1 destroys whatever chance Black has of saving his stones.




Dia. 1: failure




Dia. 2: failure

Dia. 2. Starting out with 1 is no improvement. Again Black is one move too late.


Dia. 3. Throwing in at 1 only helps White. When he links at 2, Black loses all his aji.



Dia. 3: failure



Dia. 4: the first move




Dia. 5: success?


Dia. 4. Black 1 is the vital point, but finding this move is only a start.

Dia. 5. If White answers at 2, Black 3 now works perfectly. Black 7 captures five stones, but unfortunately this is not the correct answer.


Dia. 6. If White 2, Black throws in at 3 and captures five stones after 5, so this looks like the correct answer, but ...



Dia. 6: success?



Dia. 7: success



Dia. 8: the correct answer

Dia. 7. If White answers at 2, White plays 3 and 5 and we get the same result as in Dia. 5. However, in Dias. 5 to 7 White has not made the best answer.

Dia. 8. White 2 is good, but when Black ataris at 3, the best answer is to capture at 4, leading to a ko. This is the correct answer. To arrive at it, it was necessary to read out Dias. 5 to 7 first, so solving this problem requires quite a bit of work.

(‘Let’s Go’, December 1984)

Go World News (Continued)

the winner on 11 points. Second was Denis Labelle on 10, third Paul Dumais on 9, and 4th Randall Goodwin, also on 9.

New Chinese Title

A new title, the Tian-yuan (= Japanese Tengen), has been created in China. The first winner was Ma Xiaochun, who defeated Nie 2–1 in the final. The prize is 1000 yuan.

More Chinese Professionals


The recent boom in the popularity of go in China has led the Chinese Weiqi Association to increase the number of professional players. Nine 7-dans and six 6-dans became professionals, making a total of 36 (the professional system was inaugurated in 1982).

At present in China there are five 9-dans (including one, Wu Songsheng, who migrated to Australia) and eight 8-dans, two of whom are women (Kong and Rui Naiwei).


The Great Joseki Debate

Honda Kunihisa 9-dan


How to choose a joseki in relation to the board as a whole is the theme of this debate. It is now White's turn, and three proposals are being made for his next move in the upper right corner. Which one do you think fits the fuseki best?



Dia. A



Dia. B



Dia. C


A: In this position, White doesn't have to waste a lot of time thinking. If you consider Black's thickness at the left, pressing at 1 is the only move. How often does one get the chance to play such a perfect move?

B: The pressing move lets Black make too much territory. I prefer to pincer. By laying waste to the top, White can take command of the game.

C: B doesn't seem to know the proverb that says you shouldn't come too close to your opponent's thickness. White should approach from the other side. This lets him destroy the top area in the natural flow of the moves.

Fuseki Analysis

Since josekis work effectively in a certain direction, it is necessary to examine the positions along the adjacent sides and in the adjacent corners when choosing a joseki for a particular opening. Positions in the opposite corner are usually only a factor when a ladder is involved. In this issue's fuseki (fuseki diagram, next page), the positions at the top and on the right side will determine the choice of joseki.



Fuseki Diagram

In the upper left, White has taken profit while Black has built a wall of steel on the outside. White needs a strategy that will limit Black's influence at the top.

There are two ways of destroying influence. One is to draw the opponent into an overconcentrated shape, where the strength of one position overlaps that of another. The second, which is really the same thing, is to force the opponent to surround territory with his thickness (contrary to the proverb warning against this). In both cases, the thickness is not being used as it should for attack.


Although forcing the issue by attacking thickness is not out of the question, it cannot be re-

commended as a strategy. In this issue's fuseki in particular, with Black's sphere of influence stretching across the top and down the right side, attacking would be the wrong policy.


A Wins the Debate

The pressing move at 1 in Dia. 1, which invites Black to make territory at the top, is the correct move. In fact, it could be called the only move. Before seeing how it works in the fuseki, we will study its variations.

The position in the upper right corner results from the sequence shown in Dia. 2. After Black 3, White usually chooses 'a' or 'b'. The pincer at 'c' is only seen in special cases.




Dia. 2




Dia. 3

Note that pushing at 1 in Dia. 3 is bad. White could consider giving Black fourth-line territory like this only if he were to gain significantly on the left.


If White plays the pressing move at 1 in Dia. 4, Black attaches at 2, then crawls at 4 when White descends. After exchanging 6 for 7 in Dia. 5, he crawls once more at 8 and jumps to 10. The joseki ends with White 11 and Black 12 in Dia. 6.




Dia. 4




Dia. 5



Dia. 6




Dia. 7




Dia. 1

In the local context, Black has good shape, but White is a little dissatisfied because of his distaste at being forced to answer 2 with 3 in Dia. 4.


If Black holds the 2-3 exchange in reserve, White can later answer 1 in Dia. 7 with 2 and 4. Black then needs another move because White can push through and cut with 1 and 3 in Dia. 8. After capturing the cutting stone with 4 and 6 in Dia. 9, Black loses four stones on the other side because of the perfect placement of the marked white stone. The 2-3 exchange in Dia. 4 ensures that Black ends the joseki with sente.




Dia. 8



Dia. 9




Dia. 10




Dia. 11

Attaching with 2 in Dia. 10 is the correct order. White is reluctant to play the White 'a'—Black 'b'—White 'c' sequence because it turns the corner into solid black territory. If, however, Black crawls once at 2 in Dia. 11 before attaching, White can block at 9 in Dia. 12 after forcing with 5 and 7. In this result, Black 2 in Dia. 11 has become a bad move.

The difference is clear when one compares Dia. 12 and Dia. 13. The sequences in the two diagrams are the same except that Black has




Dia. 12




Dia. 13

crawled one less time in Dia. 13. Unlike Dia. 12, however, he has made no bad moves and can aim at the hane at 'b' after peeping at 'a'.


There is one move White must watch out for: Black 1 in Dia. 14. As a general rule, one crawls on the third line as little as possible before making a one-space jump. Black 1 is one more crawl than necessary, so Black must have something up his sleeve.




Dia. 14



Dia. 15




Dia. 16




Dia. 17

If White extends at 2 in Dia. 15, Black springs 3 on him. If next White ataris at 1 in Dia. 16, he loses outright when Black connects at 2 ('a' and 'b' are miai). If instead he ataris on the other side at 1 in Dia. 17 and blocks at 3, creating a semeai, he loses the semeai after Black 4.


White can save himself, though at great cost, by switching 3 in Dia. 17 to 3 in Dia. 18, then playing a series of ataris to 15 in Dia. 19. Next, Black throws in



Dia. 18




Dia. 19




Dia. 20

with 16 in Dia. 20 (previous page). Since White cannot capture 16 because he is short of liberties, he must capture on the edge with 17, then connect at 19 in Dia. 21 when Black ataris with 18. White manages to live in the corner with the squeeze through 23 in Dia. 22, but Black's outside thickness is overwhelming.




Dia. 21




Dia. 22

What about pushing down and out with White 1 and 3 in Dia. 23, the usual moves for extricating oneself from a situation like this? Black will ignore the corner to atari at 4. Because White has no time to connect at 'a' (see Dia. 25), he ataris at 5 in Dia. 24. After both sides connect at 6 and 7, Black captures the white stone and White blocks at 9. Because of White's weak point at 'a', Black can leave the position as is.




Dia. 23




Dia. 24

Provided White 9 is an effective move, White has a playable position. Nevertheless, there are few cases in which making a ponnuki, crippling the four marked white stones, would not be a great success for Black.

If White connects at 1 in Dia. 25 instead of 5 in Dia. 24, Black will play in at 2. White can atari on the outside with 3 and capture a stone with 5,




Dia. 25




Dia. 26

but the profit he gives Black is too large.

If White switches 3 in Dia. 25 to 3 in Dia. 26, he can capture a stone in the corner with 5, but then Black will squeeze with 6 and 8 in Dia. 27 and connect at 10 in Dia. 28. This result is hopeless for White.




Dia. 27




Dia. 28

As should now be apparent, Black 1 in Dia. 29 conceals a nasty surprise for the unwary. If White continues with 2, Black 3 puts him one move behind. White stays out of trouble, however, by pushing at 2 in Dia. 30. Since Black will extend at 3, White can come back to 4. Black then jumps to 5.



Dia. 29




Dia. 30

Although the exchange of 2 for 3 is a loss for White, crawling an extra time on the third line is a loss for Black. Which is the greater loss is a subtle point, but if Black is dissatisfied with the result in Dia. 30, he should stick with the standard pattern in Dia. 6.


The joseki in Dia. 6 may be advantageous for Black, but there are positions, such as this issue's fuseki, in which it is also a good choice for White. Whatever variation is played after White 1 in Dia. 31, White 1 is the perfect move from the viewpoint of direction of play.

If Black continues by attaching at 2, White will block with 3. When Black hanes at 4, White draws back at 5. Locally White has compromised, but by doing so he has wiped out Black's influence at the top.

If Black wants to avoid this result, he will crawl at 2 in Dia. 32 without first making the 'a-b' exchange. In the result to 9, however,




Dia. 31




Dia. 33

White has attained his goal of forcing Black to make territory with his thickness. What is more, Black has had to crawl on the third line to make his territory. White also gains because he has not had to submit to the 'a-b' exchange.


Dia. 34 shows an example of when the one-space pincer is appropriate. The requirement is that the pincer is backed up by a white position in the upper left corner.



Dia. 32



Dia. 34




Dia. 35

In Dia. 33 Black played a kosumi instead of the one-space jump at 2 in Dia. 35. The kosumi prevents White 3 in Dia. 35, which allows White to link up his stones with the continuation to 9 in


B's Proposal

B proposed the invasion at 1 in Dia. 33. After the moves to Black 4, White has two weak groups to look after. Even if he is able to save both of them, the right side seems likely to turn into a large black territory. Instead of nullifying Black's thickness at the top, White has brought it to life. With a single move he has created a losing position.



Dia. 36

Dia. 36 (previous page). After White 9, Black will probably capture a stone with 10 and 12 in Dia. 37.




Dia. 37

In this result, Black has made twenty points of territory, but it is insignificant. White, on the other hand, has built a strong shape and has forcing moves at 'a' and 'b'. Attacking with 13 gives him the initiative.


Note that if Black blocks at 'a' in Dia. 35 after White 3, White will play 'b' or 'c'.

C's Proposal

C proposed White 1 in Dia. 38. Although there are too many variations to present here, all have a common feature: White tries to hinder Black's development on the side while settling his own stones in the corner. It is a greedy move that leads to immediate fighting.




Dia. 38




Dia. 39

In one typical pattern, in Dia. 39, Black pushes out at 2 to avoid being hemmed in. White 3 next is natural. To give White as little leverage as possible, Black pulls back solidly at 4, after which White makes shape with 5 and 7 in Dia. 40. Black then protects against the cut with 8.




Dia. 40



Dia. 41

After White 9, Black takes profit in the corner with 10 in Dia. 41, then extends to 12 when White butts into him with 11.




Dia. 42


In this issue's fuseki, as we have already noted, Black's sphere of influence extends across the top and down the right side, so White 1 in Dia. 42 is unreasonable. Black will follow the variation in Dia. 42 up to 9, but instead of taking the corner territory with 'a', he will strike at the vital point of White's shape with 10. This move takes advantage of his thickness at the top, whereas following the joseki would give him an undesirable low position there.

Readers who feel uncomfortable about White pushing through at 'b' (Black blocks) can play 10 at 'c'; the result is still satisfactory. Another alternative is Black 'd'. But no matter which move Black chooses, fighting erupts, bringing his thickness to life.

As a final note, White 2 and 4 in Dia. 43 are possible because Black chose the one-space low pincer. Black 1, 'a', and 'b' in Dia. 44 would all be correct.



Dia. 43



Dia. 44

('Gekkan Gogaku', November 1981. Translated by David Thayer.)

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